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Despite the overwhelming public awareness of sexual harassment in the
workplace, many federal courts still apply an unnecessarily stringent
evidentiary burden to these claims. Following the Supreme Court’s lead in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the lower courts have imposed a heightened
plausibility pleading standard on harassment cases, preventing these claims
from proceeding at the nascent stages of the case.
Workplace harassment is an undeniable fact of our society, and the courts
should accept this fact when it is pled in a discrimination complaint, rather
than prematurely eviscerating these claims on dismissal. This Article argues
that, given the current public awareness of harassment, along with the
concomitant social science research and data supporting its prevalence in
the workplace, any individual claim of harassment is inherently plausible.
Thus, Twombly and Iqbal are largely irrelevant for harassment cases, and
these claims are better vetted after discovery.
This Article reviews the existing research on harassment and proposes a
new framework for pleading hostile work environment claims. Navigating
the procedural rules and Supreme Court precedent, this Article explains
how the proposed model can be used by the courts to more fully analyze
sexual harassment cases.
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Sexual violence & harassment can happen to anyone at anytime
anywhere . . . . Ppl remain silent 4 many different very personal
reasons . . . . Sexual or physical violence, harassment,
demeaning language [are] NOT the price one should pay for
seeking or maintaining employment. Period.
— Gabrielle Union, Twitter, Oct. 15, 20171
INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this Article is straightforward: sexual harassment in the
workplace is a fact. When properly pled, this fact of workplace
harassment should be accepted in an employment discrimination
complaint brought under federal law. Given the widespread nature of
sexual harassment in the employment context, any individual allegation
of harassment is plausible, and should — in most instances — survive
the Supreme Court’s standard for dismissal.
This Article provides a new lens through which to view the Supreme
Court decisions in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly2 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.3 These two cases abrogated decades of well-established pleading
precedent, creating a new test which requires that a federal complaint
include enough facts to state a plausible claim to relief.4 Despite arising
outside of the employment discrimination context, the plausibility
standard has generated enormous confusion for workplace plaintiffs,
and has created an unrealistically high bar for sexual harassment claims.
Given what we now know about the prevalence of sexual harassment in
our society, through social science research and other data, it is a fair
conclusion that any individual claim of harassment is plausible. This is
not to say that any specific harassment allegation is probable, likely, or
should even proceed to trial. Rather, this Article makes the relatively
simple — yet important — assertion that any individual claim of sexual
harassment in the workplace is on its face plausible unless proven
otherwise.

1 Gabrielle Union (@itsgabrielleu), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/itsgabrielleu/status/919597648679759872 [https://perma.cc/UZ8N2L8C]; Gabrielle Union (@itsgabrielleu), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/itsgabrielleu/status/919598577508380673 [https://perma.cc/Z76TFJWV]; Gabrielle Union (@itsgabrielleu), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:25 AM),
https://twitter.com/itsgabrielleu/status/919600216420093952 [https://perma.cc/BPU8W8VL].
2 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
4 See, e.g., id. at 678 (discussing the plausibility pleading standard).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibits
employment discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color,
sex, national origin, and religion.5 This federal law has also been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to prohibit workplace sexual
harassment that is unwelcome, severe or pervasive, and imputable to an
employer.6 The plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
applies to employment discrimination and sexual harassment plaintiffs,
and victims of harassment are now required to plead sufficient facts to
articulate a plausible claim.7 Employment discrimination claimants (as
well as all civil rights plaintiffs) have faced difficulty in overcoming this
new pleading bar.8
The problem is easily identifiable — it is one of intent. To successfully
plead a sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must typically show that
the employer intended to discriminate.9 At the pleading stage of a case,
intent is quite difficult to establish, as a worker will not have access to
important information that is in the employer’s control — such as
personnel files, correspondence, or the statements of other employees.
This information is usually gathered as part of the discovery process
which follows the filing of a federal complaint.10
This Article identifies the startling consequences that the plausibility
standard has had for sexual harassment plaintiffs. This Article details
some of the egregious allegations of sexual harassment that have
recently been dismissed by the federal courts — including cases that
have alleged threatening remarks, sexual comments, and physical
touching.11 Despite the severity of the conduct involved, however, these
cases were not allowed to proceed to discovery in light of the plausibility
standard. Unfortunately, this has occurred in more than one or two
isolated incidents — indeed, the Twombly/Iqbal standard has routinely

5

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
See infra Part I.A (outlining elements of federal sexual harassment claim under
workplace law).
7 See generally Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (applying the plausibility standard to all civil
claims).
8 See infra Part I.D (describing research which shows that employment
discrimination plaintiffs have encountered difficulty satisfying the plausibility
standard).
9 See infra Part I.C (discussing the intent requirement in federal employment
discrimination cases).
10 See infra Part I.C.
11 See infra Part I.D.
6
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been used by the judiciary to dismiss what otherwise appear to be viable
sexual harassment allegations in the workplace.12
In light of the overwhelming social science data firmly establishing
the ongoing nature of sexual harassment in the workplace, it is now
appropriate to revisit how the courts have applied the plausibility
standard to these claims. The #MeToo movement has performed a
critical function in bringing allegations of sexual assault and harassment
to light.13 This movement has provided our society with a new
understanding of the prevalence and true nature of this improper and
often disgusting conduct.14 The evidence that we now have of
harassment in the workplace is convincing, and the fact of workplace
harassment is well-supported by social science research, governmental
data, litigation statistics, and other related information.15 Too often
there is a gap between this type of social science research and the legal
profession — this Article attempts to bridge that divide in the area of
sex discrimination in the workplace.
Indeed, the social science research reflects clear evidence of sex
discrimination and workplace sexual harassment. Studies have shown
that women have been discriminated against during the hiring process,
as part of their employment, and when seeking promotions.16 Moreover,
12 See infra Part I.D (discussing cases where federal courts have applied the
plausibility standard to sexual harassment claims in an overly rigid way).
13 See, e.g., Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo,
Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 51-52 (“Alyssa Milano’s
#MeToo was not styled as a social movement and ‘[wa]sn’t a call to action or the
beginning of a campaign, culminating in a series of protests and speeches and events. It
[wa]s simply an attempt to get people to understand the prevalence of sexual
harassment and assault in society. To get women, and men, to raise their hands.’”
(alterations in original) (quoting Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo: How a
Hashtag Got Its Power, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ [https://perma.cc/VSD8WFBP])).
14 L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal Movement Too?,
22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 324 (2018) (“The ‘MeToo’ Movement has taught the
public that sexual harassment and sexual assault are pervasive in our society, and that
millions of women can be counted among its targets.”); see also Deborah Epstein & Lisa
A. Goodman, Discounting Women: Doubting Domestic Violence Survivors’ Credibility and
Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 458 (2019) (“The #MeToo moment
represents the beginning of a shift in cultural understanding and good will. The
floodgate of stories from blue collar workers to Hollywood A-listers has forced society
to face the realities encountered by so many women in the American workplace.”). See
generally Wexler et al., supra note 13 (discussing origins of the #MeToo movement).
15 See infra Part II.A (addressing recent studies on sex discrimination in the
workplace).
16 See infra Part II.A.
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recent studies by social scientists and other researchers reflect the
pervasive nature of sexual harassment in the workplace and further
reveal some of the egregious conduct that is still taking place in this
environment. For example, one study revealed that almost ten million
workers in this country have been subjected to some form of sexual
harassment at their place of employment.17 And research has
established that anywhere between 25% and 75% of women report
having been sexually harassed at some point in their careers, depending
upon how the term is defined and the particular industry involved.18
One study concluded that “[h]arassing behaviors are committed by
blue-collar and white-collar workers, Democrats and Republicans, the
young and the old, the married and the unmarried, high earners and
low ones, people who feel powerful at work and those who do not.”19
Similarly, consistent with the social science research, data gathered
by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
reflects that this government agency has found cause to believe that
sexual harassment has occurred hundreds of times each year over the
past decade.20 Indeed, during fiscal year 2018 alone, the government
recovered close to $70 million for workplace harassment victims.21 The
private litigation numbers are just as alarming, and there have been
numerous multi-million dollar verdicts in sexual harassment cases
across the country in recent years.22 And of course, while often
anecdotal, media and other investigative reports and other high-profile
journalism have uncovered continuing harassment in the employment
context.23
Together, the social science research, governmental data, and
litigation statistics paint a clear picture of the fact of ongoing sexual
17 Carolyn Crist, Almost 10 Million in U.S. Have Faced Sexual Violence at Work,
REUTERS (Dec. 26, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthworkplace-sexual-violence/almost-10-million-in-u-s-have-faced-sexual-violence-atwork-idUSKBN1YU188 [https://perma.cc/6EXM-HJU2].
18 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing existing research on sexual harassment in the
employment setting).
19 Jugal K. Patel, Troy Griggs & Claire Cain Miller, We Asked 615 Men About How
They Conduct Themselves at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/28/upshot/sexual-harassment-survey600-men.html [https://perma.cc/7DJX-GFL4].
20 See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing governmental data on sexual harassment and
discrimination).
21 See infra Part II.A.3.
22 See infra Part II.A.4 (addressing and collecting data on successful private
litigation verdicts and settlements in the sexual-harassment context).
23 See infra Part II.B (outlining newspaper reports and other accounts of workplace
sexual harassment in recent years).
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harassment in the workplace. As a fact, sexual harassment in
employment can be pled in a federal complaint, and this Article
proposes a new framework for how to properly place this information
before the federal courts. This Article identifies a four-part model that
allows plaintiffs to plead the fact of sexual harassment in the workplace,
and it explains how this allegation can properly be supported with the
relevant social science research and other data.24
Relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c),25 which permits
attachments to the complaint that are central to the allegations and are
specifically referenced in the complaint, the model proposed in this
Article articulates a clear path for litigants to use when navigating the
unnecessarily difficult pleading process for harassment claims. The
proposed model also offers defendants the opportunity to properly
rebut the plaintiff’s claims, and to explain why the facts of the instant
case present the unusual situation where dismissal is appropriate.
The proposed pleading framework suggested here reflects the
ongoing fact of sexual harassment in our society, making clear that any
individual allegation of sexual harassment is plausible. In the vast
majority of cases, then, Twombly and Iqbal are largely irrelevant to
sexual harassment claims, as the plausibility standard will be satisfied
in most instances. The proposed pleading model will thus help
streamline the caselaw with respect to sexual harassment cases, clarify
what is necessary for individual harassment pleadings, and enhance
certainty in the entire process.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I of this Article discusses the
difficulty plaintiffs face pleading discriminatory intent in workplace
cases. This Part further outlines the basis for sexual harassment under
Title VII, setting forth the elements necessary under Supreme Court
case law to prevail on a workplace harassment claim. This Part also
explains the plausibility pleading standard, exploring its negative
impact on sexual harassment cases in the federal courts. This Part
specifically examines some of the more alarming district court decisions
24 See infra Parts III.B, III.C (discussing proposed pleading model for harassment
claims and an example of its use). The analysis and model discussed here are similar to
what I proposed in my prior work. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination
Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115 (2019). However, unlike my prior work, this
piece focuses exclusively on the complex issue of sexual harassment discrimination
under federal law. This Article thus takes the next step in addressing the pleading
requirements for this specific subset of sex discrimination claims. See id. at 1129 n.88
(“Sexual harassment, a special subset of gender discrimination claims, has also garnered
widespread attention recently . . . . The growing amount of evidence in this area
suggests that harassment is widespread and pervasive in our society as well.”).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).
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that have rejected Title VII sexual harassment allegations even in the
face of disturbing facts found in the complaint.
Part II of this Article bridges the gap between the social science
research and the law of harassment. This Part details some of the
voluminous recent studies performed by social scientists and other
research groups revealing the existence of ongoing harassment in the
workplace. This Part also summarizes the litigation statistics that exist
on the issue, as well as the current EEOC data on workplace
harassment. Part III of this Article proposes a pleading model for
workplace claims. This section explains how, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 10(c), the fact of workplace harassment — along
with the corresponding studies and other data — can properly be
introduced in the federal complaint. The four-part framework proposed
in this Part, along with a detailed explanation of how it complies with
the federal rules, is carefully explained in this section. Part IV explores
some of the implications of adopting the proposed pleading framework,
detailing the benefits and potential drawbacks of this approach.
I.

THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
A. Elements of Harassment

The standards for bringing a claim of sexual harassment are now wellestablished under Supreme Court case law.26 First, a plaintiff must
establish that she was subjected to unwelcome hostile conduct on the
basis of sex that rose to the level of being both subjectively and
objectively severe or pervasive.27 The offensive conduct is often either
26 See Mary Ann Connell & Donna Euben, Evolving Law in Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment and Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 31 J.C. & U.L. 193, 195-200 (2004)
(citing Ellison v. Brady 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); then citing Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987); and then citing Patricia H. v. Berkeley
Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D. Cal. 1993)) (“To constitute sexual
harassment, the underlying conduct must be unwelcome to the victim, as well as
objectively offensive to the public at large. Some courts have recognized that men and
women may experience the same conduct differently and have adopted a ‘reasonable
woman’ or ‘reasonable person of the same gender’ standard.”).
27 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986); David Smith & Ryan
T. Williams, Sexual Harassment, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 639, 658 (2002) (citing Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)) (“In evaluating severity and
pervasiveness, the fact finder must conclude both that the victim subjectively perceived
the environment to be and that it was, indeed, objectively offensive from the perspective
of a reasonable person.”); see also Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The
Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace
Settings, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009) (“Taken together, the severe or pervasive
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sexual in nature, or abusive toward a particular sex.28 The
discrimination must be intentional.29
Once a plaintiff establishes a hostile work environment, it must still
be imputed to the employer.30 This is accomplished through traditional
agency principles.31 Where a supervisor is perpetrating the harassment,
the employer may still show — by way of an affirmative defense — that
it took appropriate action under the circumstances.32 Where a coworker is implicated, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
standard and the unwelcomeness doctrine are two of the most significant hurdles a
plaintiff must overcome in order to bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim.”).
28 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998); see
also Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REV. 133,
160 (2005) (“The Court explained that, in addition to sexual desire, same-sex cases also
could be based on sexual conduct caused by a ‘general hostility’ toward a particular sex
or specifically directed at one sex in a mixed-sex environment.” (quoting Oncale, 523
U.S. at 80-81)).
29 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“The
ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim [under
Title VII] is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”);
Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1077 (2017)
(“[F]ederal case law interpreting Title VII disparate treatment currently requires proof
of ‘intentional discrimination.’” (quoting Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment
Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1450-51 (2012))). See generally Seiner, supra note
24, at 1124-28 (discussing the requirement that intent be shown and subsequent
difficulties in doing so); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law,
128 YALE L.J. 1566, 1596-1600 (2019) (discussing disparate impact law).
30 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and
Social Knowledge: The Implications of Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to
Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 281 (2001) (“The
element of imputing liability is just one of several an employee must establish in order
to make out a prima facie claim of sexual harassment.”).
31 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; see also Louis P.
DiLorenzo & Laura H. Harshbarger, Employer Liability for Supervisor Harassment After
Ellerth and Faragher, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 3, 24 (1999) (“The Court clearly
articulated that the standard for employer liability is based in traditional agency
principles, and, more particularly, agency principles under the Restatement.” (citing
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-56; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 796-98)).
32 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; see also Heather S. Murr,
The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for Supervisory
Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV.
529, 535 (2006) (“[T]he Court in Ellerth and Faragher held that the employer is
vicariously liable but may assert and prove a two-prong affirmative defense to liability
or damages. The first prong of the affirmative defense is based on negligence principles
and requires the employer to prove that it ‘exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior.’” (footnote omitted) (first citing
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; and then citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765)).
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corrective action.33 If the employer takes a tangible action on the basis
of sex — such as firing the worker — there is no affirmative defense and
the defendant is subject to vicarious liability.34
B. The Plausibility Requirement
A sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII is subject to the
same procedural rules as any other civil claim. For decades, the civil
pleading standards were well established, following the Supreme
Court’s oft-cited decision in Conley v. Gibson35 that a plaintiff’s claim
should be allowed to proceed except where “it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”36 This standard supported the relaxed
notice pleading requirement inherent for years in the federal rules.37
Pursuant to notice pleading, as long as the defendant was given basic

33 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-60 (discussing the negligence standard in sexual
harassment cases); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800 (same); see also B. Glenn George, If
You’re Not Part of the Solution, You’re Part of the Problem: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 139 (2001) (“[E]mployers can be held
responsible for co-worker harassment only if they ‘knew (or should have known) of the
harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action.’” (citations omitted)).
34 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; see also DiLorenzo &
Harshbarger, supra note 31, at 14 (“Where the plaintiff demonstrates a tangible job
detriment, the employer’s liability is automatic. Where there has been no tangible job
detriment, the employer may avoid liability by successfully asserting the affirmative
defense.” (footnote omitted) (first citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64; and then citing
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-09)).
35 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
36 Id. at 45-46.
37 See id. at 47; Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s
ruling in Conley v. Gibson, in which it famously stated, ‘[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim . . . .’ That philosophy was recited by
the Court on several occasions during Conley’s fifty-year reign.” (second alteration in
original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of
Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 73 (2008) (“For fifty
years, Conley v. Gibson stood as the landmark decision on pleading under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the ‘Rules’), establishing that a complaint is sufficient to
initiate a lawsuit if it gives fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim.” (footnote omitted) (citing
Conley, 355 U.S. 41)); see also Michael R. Huston, Note, Pleading with Congress to Resist
the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L. REV. 415, 434-35 (2010)
(“Conley’s commitment to notice pleading served as the dominant pleading rhetoric for
fifty years.”).
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notice of the allegations against it, the claim was permitted to proceed
into discovery where the plaintiff could gather additional evidence.38
In the employment discrimination context, the procedural rules were
applied by the Supreme Court in a similarly relaxed way. In
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.,39 the Court examined the appropriate
pleading standards in an employment discrimination matter. In that
case, the plaintiff alleged both age and national origin discrimination in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as
well as Title VII.40 The Court rejected the dismissal of the complaint,
holding expressly that the plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case to
advance the claim to discovery.41 Following the guidance it had set forth
in Conley, the Court opined that the lower courts “may dismiss a
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set
of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.”42
Thus, for decades in both civil cases generally and in employment
discrimination cases specifically, the Court applied a relaxed notice
pleading standard that allowed claims to be evaluated after discovery
had taken place, and after the relevant facts had been gathered by the

38 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48; see also William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at
Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 695 (2016) (“As originally envisioned by
the drafters of the FRCP, and as affirmed in the seminal case Conley v Gibson, the
gatekeeping function of federal judges was minimal: they used a standard of notice
pleading, which required only that a pleading give the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s
grievance.” (footnote omitted) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. 41)); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009) (footnote omitted)
(first citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; and then citing Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth
of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1011-59 (2003)) (“Though the Supreme Court
had indicated that Rule 8 required only simple notice pleading with no need for factual
detail, lower federal courts developed and imposed their own more stringent pleading
standards for certain claims that required increased levels of factual detail before . . .
discovery.”).
39 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
40 Id. at 509.
41 Id. at 515; see also Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment
Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1626 (2011) (“Swierkiewicz rejected any
requirement that the plaintiff plead a prima facie case of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas formula in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” (footnote
omitted)); Tanvir Vahora, Note, Working Through a Muddled Standard: Pleading
Discrimination Cases After Iqbal, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 235, 242-43 (2010) (“[In
Swierkiewicz,] [t]he Court emphasized that an employment discrimination complaint
need not plead a prima facie case in the complaint and reversed the lower courts’
application of heightened pleading to the case.”).
42 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
73 (1984)).
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parties.43 Notice pleading was the dominant approach to federal
pleading.44 The Court would dramatically change these well-established
standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,45 where it reversed course
on its liberal approach to pleading. In Twombly, the Court revisited the
pleading standards in the context of a complex antitrust case.46 As the
facts of Twombly and Iqbal are now well traveled ground, this Article
only briefly summarizes the background and holdings of those
decisions.
The plaintiffs in Twombly brought a class action lawsuit, alleging in
the complaint that the defendant, along with other telecommunication
companies, violated antitrust law — more specifically Section 1 of the
Sherman Act — by engaging in “parallel conduct.”47 The Court
concluded that the complaint filed in the case was insufficient, and that
pleading more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of the claim
was necessary to proceed.48 Indeed, the Court concluded that pleading
more than “labels and conclusions” are needed in the complaint,49 and

43 See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading,
101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2015) (“Until Iqbal and [Twombly], the Supreme Court
maintained a consistent commitment to Conley’s notice pleading rule, twice
unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards that lower courts had introduced
in civil rights and employment discrimination cases . . . .”); Vahora, supra note 41, at
238 (“In Conley, the Supreme Court established ‘notice pleading’ as the standard for
Rule 8 complaints. This standard set a low bar for plaintiffs, comporting with the Rules’
goal of allowing greater access to the courts.” (footnote omitted) (citing Conley, 355
U.S. at 45-46)).
44 See Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 441, 452 (2010) (“Until very recently, the Court never wavered in reaffirming
Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard and its ‘no set of facts’ language, even in
antitrust cases.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300
(2010) (“For more than a half-century, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were read
as adopting an approach to pleading known as notice pleading.”). See generally Conley,
355 U.S. at 45-46 (“In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”).
45 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
46 Id. at 553; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527 (2010) (“In Twombly, a 2007 antitrust case, the Court wrote an
opinion that started a revolution in pleading and the federal civil litigation system.”).
47 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550 (quoting Amended Complaint at 47, Twombly v. Bell
Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220)).
48 Id. at 555, 570.
49 Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
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that any viable claim must suggest a “right to relief above the speculative
level.”50
Most importantly, the Court abrogated the “puzzling” language from
Conley that the lower courts could only dismiss the pleadings if it was
clear that there were “no set of facts” that would support the
allegations,51 noting that this standard is one that should be
“forgotten.”52 In place of the Conley standard, the Court adopted a
plausibility requirement, holding that plaintiffs must allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”53 Successful
claims are thus ones that sufficiently “nudg[e] their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.”54 This standard, according to the
Court, would help avoid the “potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no ‘reasonably founded hope that the
[discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence’ to support” a claim.55
Thus, the Court in Twombly replaced the relaxed “any set of facts
language” from Conley — which had dominated pleading standards for
years — with a more rigid standard which now requires the pleading of
sufficient facts in the complaint to establish a plausible claim.56 There
was initially a robust academic debate as to whether this plausibility
requirement would apply only to antitrust claims (like the one in
Twombly), or whether the standard would apply outside of this context

50 Id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).

& ARTHUR RAPHAEL MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

51 Id. at 562-63 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly,
550 U.S. 544).
52 Id. at 563.
53 Id. at 570.
54 See id.
55 Id. at 559-60 (alteration in original) (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
56 See id. at 563, 570; Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading
in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly
and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1121 (2010) (“The Court, with little fanfare
or warning, retired Conley’s broad ‘no set of facts’ standard and announced a new, more
exacting standard for pleading ‘plausibility.’” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-64)); see
also Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the
Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2010 (2010) (“The Twombly
decision moved pleading requirements from the realm of the possible to the realm of
the plausible.”).
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as well.57 This question was quickly resolved by the Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.58
In Iqbal, the Court addressed whether the plaintiff, a Pakistani citizen
and Muslim, had properly alleged a Bivens and Section 1983 claim
against former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI director Robert
Mueller.59 The plaintiff in the case, Javaid Iqbal, maintained that he had
been harshly confined because of his race, religion and national origin.60
Iqbal was considered a “high interest” detainee, and had been arrested
on criminal charges following the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001.61
Considering these allegations, the Court held that Iqbal had failed to
assert a plausible claim.62 Noting that while the federal rules do not
mandate “detailed factual allegations,” the Court nonetheless advised
that a federal complaint must include more than simply an “unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”63 Here, the Court
concluded that the plaintiff was unable to “‘nudge[] [his] claims’ of
invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to
plausible.’”64 Rather, the allegations presented simply a “‘formulaic
recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.”65
57 See, e.g., Mary Kay Kane, Pretrial Procedural Reform and Jack Friedenthal, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 30, 36 n.27 (2009) (“Twombly itself was an antitrust case and several
lower courts initially indicated that its heightened pleading standards might apply only
in the complex business litigation setting.”); Schneider, supra note 46, at 528
(“Discussion initially focused on whether the Supreme Court intended the case to reach
pleading generally or whether it was limited to antitrust cases.” (footnote omitted));
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 56, at 1124 (“Justice Stevens’s dissent and numerous
commentators expressed uncertainty about whether the Court in Twombly intended its
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to apply to all civil cases or to be
limited to antitrust matters.” (footnote omitted)).
58 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
59 Id. at 666. The Court noted that to succeed the allegations must provide
“sufficient factual matter to show that [defendants] adopted and implemented the
detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of
discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.” Id. at 677.
60 Id. at 669.
61 Id. at 667. The allegations further provided that the defendants “‘each knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ [the plaintiff] to harsh
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin for no legitimate penological interest.’” Id. at 669 (second
alteration in original).
62 Id. at 682. Just like in Twombly, the Court here applied the plausibility standard
to the facts of the case. Id. at 684.
63 Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
64 Id. at 680.
65 Id. at 681.
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Perhaps most importantly, the Court clarified any dispute over the
breadth of the plausibility standard it had announced previously.
Indeed, the Court made completely clear in its decision that the new
standard would apply not only to complex antitrust cases, but to all
federal pleadings. The Court, then, specifically held that the plausibility
test should apply to “all civil actions,”66 including “antitrust and
discrimination suits alike.”67
Following the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, it was clear that the
Conley relaxed pleading standard had been abrogated with respect to all
federal pleading in civil cases.68 Discrimination cases like Iqbal should
now be analyzed under the new plausibility standard.69 Just like other
federal civil litigants, then, employment discrimination plaintiffs must
also assert sufficient facts in the complaint to allege a plausible claim to
relief.70 And, as a subset of employment discrimination law, sexual
harassment plaintiffs must similarly plead sufficient facts to satisfy the
plausibility standard. There remains an ongoing debate in the appellate
courts over whether Iqbal and Twombly have also abrogated the
Supreme Court’s employment discrimination pleading decision in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, discussed earlier.71
66

Id. at 684.
Id.
68 See id.; Nathan Pysno, Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to Affirmative Defenses?,
64 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1645 (2011) (“[T]he standards espoused in Twombly and Iqbal
apply to ‘all civil actions,’ including antitrust and discrimination cases.”); Reinert, supra
note 43, at 2127 (“Iqbal resolved this short-lived dispute by making it clear that
plausibility pleading applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust claims.”); Schneider,
supra note 46, at 528 (“The 2009 Iqbal decision makes clear that Twombly set out a
general pleading standard and is not limited to antitrust cases.”); Steinman, supra note
44, at 1296 (“Concerns about Twombly have been exacerbated by Iqbal, which
eliminated any hope that Twombly might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust
cases.”).
69 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
70 See Benjamin P. Cooper, Iqbal’s Retro Revolution, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 937,
974-75 (2011) (“[T]he plausibility standard is too subjective, gives judges too much
discretion, has a chilling effect on plaintiffs, and is disproportionately harming plaintiffs
with certain kinds of disfavored claims (civil rights and employment discrimination
cases in particular).”); Sullivan, supra note 41, at 1621 (“Several scholars have warned
that plausible pleading poses a particular threat to plaintiffs in employment
discrimination cases . . . .”).
71 Compare Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[B]ecause Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too
has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and relies on
Conley.”), with Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 897 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“Swierkiewicz remains good law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly.”
(citations omitted)), and Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th
67
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C. Intent, a Difficult Pleading Hurdle
The plausibility standard has created tremendous difficulty for
workers bringing employment discrimination claims, and for civilrights plaintiffs more generally. While the plausibility standard has
created complexity in this area, the reason for the difficulty is relatively
straightforward — the problem of establishing intent. Employment
discrimination plaintiffs pursuing claims under Title VII must establish
that their employers intended to discriminate against them.72 This intent
requirement applies not only to workplace claims generally, but to
harassment allegations specifically.73
Cir. 2013) (“Neither Iqbal nor Twombly overruled Swierkiewicz, and it is our duty to
apply the Supreme Court’s precedents unless and until the Supreme Court itself
overrules them.”). See generally Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762,
768 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding plaintiffs only need to “plausibly allege facts . . . to survive
a motion to dismiss”); Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017)
(noting “the more stringent pleading standard established in Iqbal and Twombly
applies”); Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting
Iqbal said nothing on Swierkiewicz and Twombly reaffirmed Swierkiewicz); GarayaldeRijos v. Mun. of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We have explicitly held
that plaintiffs need not plead facts in the complaint that establish a prima facie case
under Title VII nor must they ‘allege every fact necessary to win at trial.’” (citation
omitted)); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Port Auth. of New York and New
Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]long with several of our sister circuits,
we recognize that Swierkiewicz has continuing viability, as modified by Twombly and
Iqbal.”); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1135 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing pleading
standards after Twombly and Iqbal ); McCone v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 582 F. App’x 798,
801 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Swierkiewicz cannot be read in a vacuum; the district court must
also consider whether the complaint satisfies Iqbal’s ‘plausible on its face’ standard and
whether the allegations are sufficient to ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level’
under Twombly.”); Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1014-15 (8th Cir.
2013) (applying Swierkiewicz analysis to gender discrimination claim); Khalik v. United
Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing pleading standards after
Twombly and Iqbal).
72 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000) (“The
ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim [under
Title VII] is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination.”);
Bornstein, supra note 29, at 1077-83; cf. Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1596-1600
(addressing disparate impact law). See generally Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing intent
requirement).
73 See David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in
Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1711 (2002) (“[P]revailing law
requires that the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent, understood in terms of the motive
of the decisionmaker or harasser.”); Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party
Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1357, 1379 (2009) (“[C]ourts analyze whether the hostile work environment
was discriminatory by asking whether the harasser acted with discriminatory intent
. . . .”); cf. Bornstein, supra note 29, at 1080 (“Over time, as courts continued to
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For sexual harassment plaintiffs, “there are indications that courts are
less willing [than in the racial discrimination context] to resolve
ambiguities in favor of the plaintiff”74 and many courts “have held that
even the most coarse sexual discourse or behavior does not result in
conduct that is sex-based.”75 Indeed, to even be covered by Title VII, a
business must have fifteen or more employees.76 Employers of this size
are often “sophisticated enough to avoid creating the proverbial
smoking gun that would easily establish unlawful intent.”77 Most
plaintiffs must therefore establish intentional discrimination by means
of circumstantial rather than direct evidence.78 This type of evidence
may not be in the worker’s control, and could include things like emails,
worker files, personnel data, or access to other employees.79 As one
federal appellate court observed, “[p]roof of [intentional]
discrimination is always difficult. Defendants of even minimal
sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a
paper trail [demonstration][.]”80
Establishing state of mind is thus an extraordinarily difficult
endeavor, particularly in the employment discrimination context — of
interpret and apply Title VII, two additional theories of proof developed — harassment
(considered a sub-type of disparate treatment) and accommodation — neither of which
require proof of discriminatory intent to establish entity-level liability.”).
74 Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me A “Bitch” Just Don’t Use the “N-Word”: Some
Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 746 (1997).
75 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year
. . . .”).
77 David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: Experimental
Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination Case
Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 906 (2010).
78 See Angela K. Herring, Untangling the Twombly-McDonnell Knot: The Substantive
Impact of Procedural Rules in Title VII Cases, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1083, 1088 (2011);
Miguel Angel Méndez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate
Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1980); see also Campbell v. Nat’l Fuel
Gas Distrib. Corp., No. 13-CV-00438-W(F), 2016 WL 8929078, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July
26, 2016) (“[D]irect evidence of discriminatory intent [with regard to employment] is
rare and such intent often must be inferred from circumstantial evidence found in
affidavits and depositions.” (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted) (alteration
in original)); Stephanopoulos, supra note 29, at 1605 (“In the absence of smoking guns,
discriminatory intent must be inferred from circumstantial evidence.”).
79 See Méndez, supra note 78, at 1130; see also Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d
368, 399 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“[A]ccess to . . . employment records . . . were proper
aspects of . . . circumstantial proof . . . .”).
80 Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
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which sexual harassment is included.81 Employees will often not have
direct access to the alleged discriminatory decision-making process
itself, which will usually have taken place outside of their presence.82
Indeed, such decisions may also involve unconscious bias, and the
employers themselves may not even be aware of their own
discriminatory animus.83
Providing evidence of the element of discriminatory intent in any
harassment claim thus creates unique challenges for workers.84
81 See Title VII - Burden of Persuation [sic] in Disparate Treatment Cases, 107 HARV.
L. REV. ASS’N 342, 349 (1993).
82 See Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-Motives Claims and Gross
v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 440 (2009); see also Heather
S. Dixon, Revisiting Title VII After 50 Years: The Need for Increased Regulatory Oversight
of Employers’ Personnel Decisions, 59 HOW. L.J. 441, 454 (2016) (“[A]n individual
plaintiff has only limited information based on his or her observations and interactions
with the employer and is usually not privy to evidence of patterns of discriminatory or
retaliatory conduct against other employees.”).
83 See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment
Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 772 (1987) (noting that it
will be difficult to gather evidence “whether the responsible individuals are conscious
of their bias, and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing
unconscious bias through some discretionary decision making process”); see also
Bornstein, supra note 29, at 1095 (“[T]ens of thousands of studies have been published
on cognitive, implicit, or unconscious bias, over 1,200 of which focus on cognitive bias
in employment discrimination alone.”); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the
Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1181 (2003) (“[U]nconscious bias . . . challenges Title VII’s search
for specific discriminatory intent, arguing that the changing nature of discrimination
and the contemporary understanding of the psychology of discrimination suggest that
intent is often undiscoverable by plaintiffs, defendants, or courts.”); Dixon, supra note
82, at 455 (“In fact, academic research has confirmed the lingering existence of subtle
and even ‘unconscious’ — but nonetheless pernicious — bias that continues to exist in
our society (including in employment decisions) despite the drastic decrease in overt
discrimination that existed at the time Title VII was enacted.”). See generally Melissa
Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741
(2005) (discussing unconscious bias in employment discrimination); Audrey J. Lee,
Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. CIV. RTS.CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 481, 483 (2005) (explaining “specific strategies to apply the theory
of unconscious bias to employment discrimination litigation”); Michael Selmi, The
Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 197-98
(2018) (“Rather than defining implicit bias as unconscious and uncontrollable . . . it
should be treated as one possible step, usually the initial step, in a more elaborate
deliberative process.”).
84 See Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 65456 (2005) (discussing element of intent when proving employment discrimination);
Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in
Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 515-16 (2006) (“[I]n these cases, the
defendant generally has control over most of the evidence that might be used to prove
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Establishing intent is difficult even without the addition of new
procedural hurdles. However, by rejecting many of these claims in
advance of discovery, workplace plaintiffs are finding it increasingly
difficult to pursue these cases, even where the action is otherwise
viable.85 Much of the critical information will be in the control of the
employer, which will not be required to reveal emails, personnel files,
and other employment-related data and information in advance of
discovery.86 The plausibility standard, then, unfairly disposes of these
cases too frequently and too early — not allowing them to even get out
of the starting gates.
D. Federal Harassment Cases
Federal district courts have been rigid in their application of the
plausibility standard, particularly with respect to employment
discrimination cases. Following Twombly and Iqbal, it has been quite
difficult for plaintiffs to successfully bring discrimination claims.87
this fact.”); Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedural Justice in the Boundaryless Workplace: The
Tension Between Due Process and Public Policy, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 501, 514 (2005)
(“It is difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory
intent in today’s workplace.”); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J.
1129, 1179 (1999) (“The Supreme Court and others have recognized that subjective
bias is notoriously difficult to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the fact-finder. That
observation applies regardless of whether the bias is inadvertent or quite deliberate.”).
See generally Daniel Leigh, The Cat’s Paw Supervisor: Vance v. Ball State University’s
Flexible Jurisprudence, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1055-56 (2015) (discussing harassment
claims in a “complex and changing workplace”); Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1887 (2004) (discussing disparate treatment litigation).
85 See infra Part I.D (addressing difficulty of successfully satisfying plausibility
standard in employment discrimination cases).
86 See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee
Information Exchange in the Knowledge Economy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 651, 668 (2004)
(“[W]ithout the ability to discuss employment information with co-workers, employees
affected by discriminatory practices will find it increasingly difficult to obtain the
necessary information to evaluate their particular situations.”); Méndez, supra note 78,
at 1158 & n.146 (“To prove improper motive, plaintiffs have to rely on evidence —
direct or circumstantial — that is often within the control of employers. . . . [A]n
employer is more likely to have access to employment records, gross employment
statistics, or written statements of policy for employment decisions.” (footnote
omitted)).
87 See Sullivan, supra note 41, at 1639-40 (“While it is too early to be confident,
there are indications that Twombly and Iqbal have already had a significant effect on the
rate of dismissals generally and in employment discrimination cases in particular.”
(footnotes omitted)). See generally Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A
Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(B)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008) (discussing impact of Twombly in civil rights cases); Joseph
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Studies have shown that the plausibility standard has had a particularly
negative effect on workers seeking to bring both civil rights and
employment discrimination litigation.88
A review of the case law reveals numerous instances where the federal
courts have specifically applied a heightened pleading standard to
claims of sexual harassment. These cases seem to fly in the face of the
basic concept of notice pleading, clearly demonstrating how the
plausibility standard is overly subjective and can be used by some courts
to clear their docket of harassment claims that should be viable and
permitted to procced to discovery. A review of some of these cases can
be instructive on how the pleading standards have been heightened by
the federal courts for victims of harassment. Though not exhaustive,
these examples provide important anecdotal information on the rigidity
used by several courts in their application of the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions.
For example, in Johnson v. Hix Corp.,89 the plaintiff alleged in the
complaint that she had been successfully employed by the company as
a janitor, and had properly met the expectations of the job.90 The
plaintiff further alleged that over the course of her employment, her
supervisor told her that she should not speak with other employees
without first obtaining his permission “because she was a married
woman.”91 The same supervisor also “yelled at Plaintiff and told her not
to talk to any male employees because all men have sexual thoughts in
the back of their heads.”92 And, this manager advised another worker at
the company “that the only reason other employees would want to talk
to her was because they were ‘trying to sniff that.’”93 The plaintiff also
alleged that management was informed of this conduct, and that she
A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (discussing application of Twombly in
employment discrimination cases).
88 See, e.g., Hannon, supra note 87, at 1835-38 (addressing impact of plausibility
standard in civil rights cases); Seiner, supra note 87 (discussing the difficulty of the
plausibility standard for employee plaintiffs); Sullivan, supra note 41 (discussing
plausibility standard in discrimination cases); cf. Hébert, supra note 14, at 325 (“Even
when targets assert legal claims for workplace sexual harassment, it has been difficult
for women to prevail on those claims. This difficulty is largely caused by the showing
that courts have required to satisfy the various elements of a claim of sexual harassment,
in part because of the reluctance of courts to allow women to recover money damages
and other remedies for what the courts often view as relatively trivial harm.”).
89 No. 15-CV-07843, 2015 WL 7017374 (D. Kan. Nov. 10, 2015).
90 Id. at *1.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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further requested that this type of behavior should stop.94 Finally, the
plaintiff alleged that after bringing this complaint to the company, she
was subsequently fired.95
Despite the specificity of these sexual harassment allegations, the
federal court found the pleading insufficient to proceed.96 The court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the sexual harassment claim
because it did “not provide details as to the frequency of the comments,
whether they were made in front of fellow employees, or whether these
comments or other actions interfered with her work performance.”97
Applying the plausibility standard the court concluded that the plaintiff
failed to provide sufficient “facts to raise her right to relief above the
speculative level.”98 The court also granted the dismissal motion with
respect to the sexual discrimination claim in the case, because the
assertion that “[p]laintiff was treated differently than similarly situated
male employees when she was unfairly disciplined and terminated for
alleged offenses”99 was “not plausible under the Twombly/Iqbal
standard.”100 The plaintiff’s allegation that she “would not have been
terminated but for her gender”101 was too conclusory and was thus
disregarded by the court.102
Another federal district court recently applied the plausibility
standard in a rigid way in dismissing a sexual harassment claim with
arguably even more egregious facts. In Looney v. Simply Aroma LLC,103
the plaintiff set forth in the complaint that she was subjected to a coworker who “would rub his penis against Looney’s buttocks, grab her
waist when he walked by her, and commit other unwelcomed advances
and touching.”104 In one instance, this employee also “grabbed [the
plaintiff’s] buttocks with both hand[s] and pulled her to his body.”105
The plaintiff further alleged that her complaints were specifically
rebuffed by the owner of the company.106 Despite these facts, the federal
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *4 n.32.
Id.
No. CV 1:17-00294-N, 2018 WL 1002622 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2018).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
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court held that the employee had “not alleged sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to plausibly show the harassment she endured . . . was
objectively severe or pervasive enough to sustain a Title VII sexual
harassment claim.”107 Thus, the employee “fails offer [sic] sufficient
factual detail that would allow the Court to reasonably infer the
frequency in which [the employee’s] actions occurred over the course
of her employment with [the employer].”108 And, the plaintiff “failed to
offer any specific factual allegations demonstrating how [the] conduct
interfered with her job performance, unreasonably or otherwise. Her
allegation that his conduct ‘materially affected the terms and conditions
of [her] employment’ is a legal conclusion that the Court need not
accept as true.”109 Thus, the court did not find that enough facts had
been alleged in the case to support a plausible showing of
severity/pervasiveness under Twombly.110
Similarly, in Pastoriza v. Keystone Steel & Wire, a worker brought a
claim alleging sexual harassment and unlawful termination.111 The facts
alleged in the complaint included that plaintiff’s co-workers, “including
the re-entry hires, the Union representatives, his supervisors and others,
called Plaintiff a ‘snitching b . . . ’, told him to perform sex acts, and
announced their dissatisfaction of him by stating ‘I don’t like weak ass
homosexual[ ] acting n . . . ’. . . . These employees allegedly also ‘played
with their private parts’ and blew kisses at Plaintiff.”112 Again, the court
— even with these facts — found insufficient evidence to allow the case
to proceed under the Twombly/Iqbal standard.113 The court concluded
that the “submissions to the Court contain factual allegations that do
not allow the Court to conclude it is plausible Plaintiff was harassed
because of his gender.”114
And, in Kleehammer v. Monroe,115 a federal court in New York
dismissed a hostile work environment claim brought under Title VII
where the plaintiff, a female deputy sheriff jailor, “was subject to
graphic live sex in the workplace” when she was “compelled to watch”
as “a female visitor masturbated in front of a male inmate in violation
107

Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
109 Id.
110 Id. at *5.
111 Pastoriza v. Keystone Steel & Wire, No. 15-cv-1174, 2015 WL 8490902, at *2
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2015).
112 Id.
113 Id. at *5.
114 Id. at *5.
115 743 F. Supp. 2d 175 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
108
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of well established jail policies.”116 While the plaintiff observed the
conduct, she was instructed by other employees not to intervene while
these co-workers made detailed and offensive comments about personal
feminine hygiene.117 Despite these egregious facts, the court could not
find the existence of “a plausible hostile environment claim,” in part
because no evidence was alleged showing that this conduct was taken
“because of Plaintiff’s sex.”118
These cases are obviously only a sampling, but there can be little
doubt that many federal courts are applying the plausibility standard in
a heightened way.119 These cases show not only how strict some federal
courts have been in applying this standard, but also in the
unpredictability of the litigation process. Defining precisely what facts
are necessary to bring a sexual harassment claim is now a difficult, if
not impossible, endeavor. If the facts outlined in the cases above do not
satisfy the standard, it is hard to imagine exactly what facts would be
necessary to guarantee a viable sexual harassment claim. Twombly and
Iqbal removed the certainty of the notice pleading standard that was
well-established by Conley for decades, and now plaintiffs are left
guessing as to whether they will even get to discovery — sometimes
with the type of alarming results described here.
There may be some reassurance that certain federal appellate courts
have rebuffed lower courts that have too stringently looked to
Twombly/Iqbal to reject a sexual harassment claim.120 Nonetheless, the
116

Id. at 178.
Id.
118 Id. at 184-85.
119 See, e.g., Gray v. Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, No. 5:16-cv-973, 2018
WL 1804694, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018) (“[Employee] cannot affix a conclusory
label of ‘sexual harassment’ on unspecified conduct without alleging facts that, if
accepted as true, allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that [employer] is
liable.”); Curasco v. Calabrese, No. 2:15-3963, 2016 WL 5219583, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept.
20, 2016) (dismissing a sexual harassment claim on the grounds that “threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action . . . are insufficient to state a claim” (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))); Harris v. Thomas, No. 15-cv-02510, 2015
WL 4735179, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) (finding that “allegations of sexual
harassment and ‘whitewashing’ . . . without more,” were insufficient under the Iqbal
pleading standard); McDermott v. GMD-100, LLC, No. 14-2296, 2014 WL 6895922 at
*1, *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim despite allegations that
“[d]uring the course of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was subjected to
severe and unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature because of Plaintiff’s sex, including
but not limited to, sexual comments and innuendo and offensive bodily contact”).
120 See, e.g., Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 689 (4th Cir. 2018)
(“The district court also ruled that the sex discrimination claim fails because the
Complaint does not sufficiently allege UMW’s deliberate indifference to sexual
harassment. We again disagree. Simply put, the Complaint demonstrates that —
117
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district court cases described here provide strong anecdotal support for
the argument that the judiciary has overreached in many instances
when rejecting sexual harassment complaints. Many viable cases will
never successfully be appealed for a variety of reasons; financial or
otherwise. And, the cases discussed above likely only scratch the
surface. It is also impossible to know how many seemingly viable
harassment claims have been unnecessarily dismissed with a more
cursory decision or even in an unpublished format. And, the published
decisions described here provide a strong deterrent to others
contemplating sexual harassment litigation.
II.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND SUPPORTING DATA

Sexual harassment in the workplace is a fact. This fact should be the
starting point for any Title VII litigation in the federal courts. As a fact,
the existence of sexual harassment in the employment context is easily
provable. Litigants must know where to look, however, to establish this
fact as part of the pleadings. They must further be aware of the
procedural mechanisms to follow to properly establish this fact in a
discrimination complaint. Initially, it is important to explore the
existing social science research and data that provide support for the
fact that sex discrimination is pervasive in our current society.
There are four primary categories that can be used to help support
the fact of harassment. These categories are not exhaustive, and there
may be other evidence that can be used to help establish these claims.
Nonetheless, it is worth providing these basic pigeonholes for litigants
to use when examining their individual allegations in the case. In sum,
allegations of harassment can typically be supported by (1) the
overwhelming amount of social science evidence which exists in this
area, (2) the governmental data which would support the fact of
harassment, (3) the litigation statistics which show the ongoing nature
of this discrimination, and (4) more anecdotal media reports and
investigations of these claims. The social science component of this
analysis is undoubtedly the most persuasive, but collectively, this
information paints a clear picture of the ongoing nature of

although UMW was not entirely unresponsive to allegations of harassment — the
University did not engage in efforts that were ‘reasonably calculated to end [the]
harassment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702
F.3d 655, 669 (2d Cir. 2012))); Estabrook v. Safety & Ecology Corp., 556 F. App’x 152,
155-56 (3d Cir. 2014).

2021]

Plausible Harassment

1319

discrimination in our society, and it helps to support the argument that
any individual claim of harassment is plausible.121
A. Social Science Research and Studies
Sexual harassment has been recognized for decades by the Supreme
Court as a form of gender discrimination.122 This Part discusses the
social science research that exists on gender discrimination more
broadly, and then examines the research establishing sexual harassment
specifically.
1.

Studies on Gender Discrimination Generally

Over the decades, there have been countless studies outlining the
prevalence of gender discrimination.123 Discrimination against women
on the basis of pay, promotion, and in employment generally have been
well established and this Article cannot perform an exhaustive review
of this research.124 However, it is worth examining a few of the more
recent studies exploring discrimination in this area to highlight the
ongoing nature of all forms of sex discrimination in the workplace.
For example, one study published by the National Academy of
Sciences looked specifically at the difficulty of recruiting females in the

121 See generally Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing a similar analysis for claims more
broadly brought under Title VII).
122 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 447 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986).
123 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1204 n.91 (1989) (citing W. VANCE GRANT &
THOMAS D. SNYDER, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS,
1983-84, at 103 tbl.92 (1983)); Earl F. Mellor, Investigating the Differences in Weekly
Earnings of Women and Men, 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17, 17-18 (1984). See generally
Sean W. Colligan, In Good Measure: Workforce Demographics and Statistical Proof of
Discrimination, 23 LAB. LAW. 59 (2007) (analyzing “cases in which statistical studies of
workforce data were offered as evidence of discrimination (or nondiscrimination) and
challenged by the opposing party”).
124 See generally Sebawit G. Bishu & Mohamad G. Alkadry, A Systematic Review of
the Gender Pay Gap and Factors That Predict It, 49 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 65 (2017) (examining
the gender pay gap); Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act:
Mandatory Wage Disclosure Laws — A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender
Wage Gap, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 385, 387 (2013) (exploring “the history of the gender
wage gap, the various explanations that have been proffered for it, and recent
data/studies that indicate which of these explanations are obsolete and which remain
valid”); Sylvia A. Law, Income Disparity, Gender Equality, and Free Expression, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 2479 (2019) (discussing “economic disparity and gender equality in
the United States”).
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academic sciences, and tested existing gender biases.125 More precisely,
in a randomized double-blind analysis, the study examined how science
faculty rated the application information from students at researchbased institutions of higher learning.126 The study concluded that
“faculty participants rated the male applicant as significantly more
competent and hireable than the (identical) female applicant. These
participants also selected a higher starting salary and offered more
career mentoring to the male applicant.”127 The study further found that
both men and women demonstrated a similar bias against applicants on
the basis of gender.128
Similarly, a study performed by researchers at the Harvard Business
School and The Harvard Kennedy School of Government examined how
gender impacts the hiring process.129 The study included over 600
participants, with 100 acting as prospective candidates and the other
individuals as employers.130 The study found the existence of gender
bias when selecting candidates, 131 and that “[i]ndividual evaluations
also seemed to lead to poor hiring decisions.”132 In addition, there have

125 Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham
& Jo Handelsman, Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16474, 16475 (2012). In a much more well-known study from 1997,
researchers at Princeton and Harvard looked at how blind auditions have impacted
performers in orchestras. Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality:
The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5903, 1997). The researchers concluded that “[u]sing data from
actual auditions in an individual fixed-effects framework, we find that the [use of blind
auditions] increases — by 50% — the probability a woman will be advanced out of
certain preliminary rounds . . . [u]sing data on orchestra personnel, the switch to ‘blind’
auditions can explain between 30% and 55% of the increase in the proportion female
among new hires and between 25% and 46% of the increase in the percentage female in
the orchestras since 1970.” Id.
126 Moss-Racusin et al., supra note 125, at 16475.
127 Id. at 16474.
128 Id. at 16477. The study then concluded that “[t]he dearth of women within
academic science reflects a significant wasted opportunity to benefit from the
capabilities of our best potential scientists, whether male or female. Although women
have begun to enter some science fields in greater numbers . . . , their mere increased
presence is not evidence of the absence of bias.” Id. at 16478.
129 Rachel Emma Silverman, Study Suggests Fix for Gender Bias on the Job, W ALL
ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2013, 6:56 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323706704578229891743848414 [https://perma.cc/FL23-Q9F8].
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. Another interesting study looked at the importance of published pay rates.
Marlene Kim, Pay Secrecy and the Gender Wage Gap in the United States, 54 INDUS. REL.
648, 648-49 (2015). The study suggested that “prohibiting pay secrecy in . . . states is
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been numerous recent discussions of the potential role of blind hiring
in the employment process,133 even examining the use of artificial
intelligence in hiring.134
Another discussion of these studies published in the Harvard Business
Review noted the existence of gender discrimination “not just in hiring
but in promotion rates, performance evaluations, getting credit for good
work, and project assignments.”135 This analysis also looked at the
difference in participation rates of the genders in Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Mathematics (“STEM”) fields in college, exploring the
possible rationales to explain the higher male participation rates.136
From these studies, then, we see the ongoing nature of sex
discrimination in the workplace. While hiring and pay tend to be among
the more common fields researchers have looked at to determine the
extent of this type of improper workplace discrimination,137 there are
countless other studies which have explored these and other areas when

likely to benefit college-educated women, increasing their pay and lowering the gender
wage gap.” Id. at 656, 664.
133 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. HISCOX, TARA OLIVER, MICHAEL RIDGWAY, LILIA ARCOSHOLZINGER, ALASTAIR WARREN & ANDREA WILLIS, BEHAVIOURAL ECON. TEAM OF THE
AUSTL. GOV’T, GOING BLIND TO SEE MORE CLEARLY: UNCONSCIOUS BIAS IN AUSTRALIAN
PUBLIC SERVICE SHORTLISTING PROCESSES 6-10 (2017) (examining impact of “the deidentification of job applications” for the Australian Public Service); Henry Belot, Blind
Recruitment Trial to Boost Gender Equality Making Things Worse, Study Reveals, ABC
NEWS (June 29, 2017, 12:15 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-30/bilndrecruitment-trial-to-improve-gender-equality-failing-study/8664888 [https://perma.cc/
DKL4-GDGN] (warning that blind recruitment, a measure often intended to increase
diversity, may have the opposite effect); Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI
Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 4:04 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazonscraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G
[https://perma.cc/69A7-WUNH] (discussing gender bias in Amazon’s “experimental
recruiting engine”).
134 But see Ben Dattner, Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic, Richard Buchband & Lucinda
Schettler, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Using AI in Hiring, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr.
25, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/04/the-legal-and-ethical-implications-of-using-ai-inhiring [https://perma.cc/9CY9-FR4C] (examining impact of using artificial intelligence
in hiring process).
135 Stefanie K. Johnson, What the Science Actually Says About Gender Gaps in the
Workplace, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/08/what-the-scienceactually-says-about-gender-gaps-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/6AAQ-QRAS].
136 Id.
137 See generally Law, supra note 124, at 2483 (“The [pay] gap compounds over a
lifetime, follows women into retirement, and impacts Social Security and pensions.”).
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determining how our society currently treats women in the employment
context.138
2.

Studies on Workplace Sexual Harassment

In addition to gender discrimination research, numerous other social
science studies have looked at the existence of sexual harassment in the
workplace. These recent studies139 and surveys show the startling
prevalence of harassment in the employment context. The studies
discussed here are only a small representation of this research, which is
far from exhaustive.140
There can be little doubt that women in our society routinely
experience harassment and assault. Alarmingly, in a study published in
138 See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Gorman, Gender Stereotypes, Same-Gender Preferences, and
Organizational Variation in the Hiring of Women: Evidence from Law Firms, 70 AM. SOC.
REV. 702 (2005) (examining gender discrimination in law firm hiring); Gretchen
Gavett, What Research Tells Us About How Women Are Treated at Work, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/12/what-research-tells-us-about-how-womenare-treated-at-work [https://perma.cc/GV4T-BJKF] (discussing research on treatment of
women in employment).
139 Research on the topic of sexual harassment remains robust, and other recent
published studies continue to demonstrate the ongoing nature of this problem in the
workplace. See, e.g., UC SAN DIEGO CTR. ON GENDER EQUITY AND HEALTH & STOP STREET
HARASSMENT, MEASURING #METOO: A NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
ASSAULT 25 (2019), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
2019-MeToo-National-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E3FL-J7PJ] (“Around one-third of all women reported experiencing sexual harassment
in their workplace . . . .”).
140 It is important to note that how sexual harassment is defined will certainly impact
the rate at which it is uncovered by researchers. This Article does not attempt to define
sexual harassment precisely, other than outlining above what the courts have required
when submitting a Title VII claim. Irrespective of the exact definition of harassment,
however, the alarming research presented here unquestionably demonstrates some of
the improper sexual conduct still taking place in the workplace, and should be more
than sufficient to illustrate the plausibility of any individual claim. See generally CHAI
R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SELECT TASK
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE, REPORT OF CO-CHAIRS (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/eeoc/task_force/harassment/rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XZB-LJU7] (discussing impact of varying definitions of
sexual harassment in survey results); James E. Gruber, Methodological Problems and
Policy Implications in Sexual Harassment Research, 9 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 235,
236, 247 (1990) (“These definitions, or ones which are very similar, have
influenced . . . studies . . . . There are, however, differences among the studies in how
these definitions are employed methodologically . . . . The definitions . . . provide an
objective basis for determining types or instances of sexual harassment which are
distinct from recipient’s subjective definitions.”); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace,
112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2095-97 (2003) (addressing sexual harassment in the workplace
and its definition).
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September 2019 in the Journal of American Medicine, researchers found
that for one out of every sixteen women, their first sexual experience is
“unwanted [and] physically forced or coerced.”141 Our culture, which
has for too long tolerated this type of illegal behavior, often extends to
the treatment of women at work. In perhaps the most well-known
examination of harassment in the workplace, a select task force at the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission looked at the prevalence
of this type of unlawful discrimination, issuing a report in 2016.142 The
report prepared by the co-chairs of this committee, Chai Feldblum and
Victoria Lipnic, was sweeping in scope, and specifically examined the
prevalence of this problem.143
The report noted that approximately 25% of women have experienced
sexual harassment during their employment.144 While that number
alone is startling, it increases more dramatically when women are asked
specifically about their exposure to sexual-type behavior at the
workplace,145 irrespective of how it is defined. Indeed, about 40% of
surveyed women reported exposure to “unwanted sexual attention or
sexual coercion” in the workplace.146
The report thus found that women commonly experience sexually
harassing behavior in the workplace, even if they do not characterize it
as “sexual harassment” under societal or legal standards.147 As noted in
the report, researchers found that the unwanted conduct has a negative
impact on women (regardless of the way the conduct is defined), and
women “experience[] similar negative psychological, work and health
consequences” as a result of the behavior.148
In a related survey, the Harris Poll, conducted in late 2017, a diverse
group of over 800 workers across industries in the private sector were
interviewed with respect to their exposure to harassment.149 That
141 Laura Hawks, Steffie Woodhandler, David U. Himmelstein, David H. Bor, Adam
Gaffney & Danny McCormick, Association Between Forced Sexual Initiation and Health
Outcomes Among U.S. Women, 179 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1551, 1552, 1555 (2019).
142 FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 140.
143 See id. at 5-8.
144 Id. at 8.
145 Id. at 8-9.
146 Id. at 9-10.
147 See id. at 8-10.
148 Id. at 10 (quoting Vicki J. Magley, Charles L. Hulin, Louise F. Fitzgerald & Mary
DeNardo Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 399
(1999)).
149 Press Release, CareerBuilder, New CareerBuilder Survey Finds 72 Percent of
Workers Who Experience Sexual Harassment at Work Do Not Report It (Jan. 19, 2018),
http://press.careerbuilder.com/2018-01-19-New-CareerBuilder-Survey-Finds-72-
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survey revealed that 17% of women and 7% of men believed that they
had been subjected to harassment as part of their employment.150 These
workers reported that the harassment came from all levels of the
company, with co-workers and management representing the largest
source of harassment.151
Similar surveys confirming the results of the Harris Poll are common.
For example, in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences, one researcher found that “[e]xperts estimate that
between 35% and 50% of all working women have had at least one such
[harassing] experience.”152 Similarly, in the International Journal for
Management Reviews, another researcher concluded that “American
estimates indicate that 40–75% of women and 13–31% of men have
experienced workplace [sexual harassment].”153 And, studies
performed by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, as well as the
Department of Defense, show that “[p]revelance of [sexually harassing]
experiences ranged between 42% and 64% for women and from 14% to
19% for men” although only “between 10% and 48% of women and
about 7% of men actually label their experiences as [sexual
harassment].”154 Reviewing the data, yet another researcher found that
“[a]mong those aged 18–60 reporting ever having worked, 41% of
women . . . reported any workplace harassment over their lifetime, with
men’s harassment prevalence significantly lower, at 32% . . . .”155

Percent-of-Workers-Who-Experience-Sexual-Harassment-at-Work-Do-Not-Report-it
[https://perma.cc/94WF-QJZE]. This survey was performed by Harris for CareerBuilder.
Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Anna-Maria Marshall, Sexual Harassment: United States and Beyond, 21 INT’L
ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 721, 722 (2015).
153 Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the
Literature, 14 INT’L J. MGMT. REVIEWS. 1, 3 (2012).
154 Kathleen M. Rospenda, Judith A. Richman & Candice A. Shannon, Prevalence
and Mental Health Correlates of Harassment and Discrimination in the Workplace: Results
from a National Study, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 819, 822 (2009) (citing studies by
the United States Merit Systems Board and the U.S. Department of Defense); see also
Afroditi Pina, Theresa A. Gannon & Benjamin Saunders, An Overview of the Literature
on Sexual Harassment: Perpetrator, Theory, and Treatment Issues, 14 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 126, 128 (2009) (discussing a U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
survey of federal employees in which “44% of women . . . reported sexual harassment”).
155 Aniruddha Das, Sexual Harassment at Work in the United States, 38 ARCHIVES
SEXUAL BEHAV. 909, 909 (2009).
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Similarly, the Pew Research Center conducted a national study on
sexual harassment in 2018.156 This study included a representative
sample of over 6,000 adult age individuals.157 In all, “[s]ome 44% of
Americans say they have received unwanted sexual advances or verbal
or physical harassment of a sexual nature.” When these results are
broken down by gender, just under 60% of women acknowledge that
they have been subjected to this improper conduct, as well as 27% of
men.158 Women with more advanced educations also reported
harassment at higher levels.159 The study also found a racial divide —
with white women reporting the highest levels of harassment.160 This
analysis also looked specifically at the workplace, and close to 70% of
all women who reported harassment further indicated that they were
exposed to this conduct at work or in a professional setting.161
And, ABC News and The Washington Post performed a well-known
analysis of 1,260 adults in a randomized national survey of sexual
harassment and assault.162 The study found that “[m]ore than half of
American women have experienced unwanted and inappropriate sexual
advances from men, three in 10 have put up with unwanted advances
from male co-workers and a quarter have endured them from men who
had influence over their work situation.”163 The study also looked at the
lack of accountability for the perpetrators of this type of conduct in the
employment setting, finding that “among women who’ve personally

156 Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of #MeToo, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr.
4, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/04/sexual-harassment-at-work-inthe-era-of-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/B69P-SZY7].
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. (“Seven-in-ten women with a bachelor’s degree or more education and 65% of
women with some college but no bachelor’s degree say they have been sexually
harassed, compared with 46% of women with a high school education or less.”).
160 Id. (finding that 63% of white women indicated that they had experienced sexual
harassment compared to approximately 50% of Hispanic women and 50% of Black
women).
161 Id. The study also revealed that a “relatively small share of Americans think the
increased focus on sexual harassment and assault will lead to more opportunities for
women in the workplace in the long run. Roughly three-in-ten (28%) expect this
outcome, while 20% believe this will lead to fewer opportunities for women and 51%
say it won’t make much difference. Men and women express similar views on this
question.” Id. (emphasis in original).
162 ABC NEWS, UNWANTED SEXUAL ADVANCES: NOT JUST A HOLLYWOOD STORY 3 (Oct. 17,
2017), https://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1192a1SexualHarassment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4HEK-Q7QM] (presenting results of a ABC News/Washington Post poll
produced by Langer Research Associates).
163 Id. at 1.
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experienced unwanted sexual advances in the workplace, nearly all, 95
percent, say male harassers usually go unpunished.”164 The study also
revealed that women frequently report anger, intimidation, humiliation,
and shame as a result of the unlawful conduct, thus establishing the
devastating emotional impact that can result for the victims involved.165
Moreover, the Morning Consult/New York Times performed a study
which looked at the extent to which males have conceded to having
exposed females to improper sexual conduct.166 The analysis was
startling, as around 10% of males admitted to such conduct as
“touching, making comments about someone’s body and asking
colleagues on dates after they’ve said no.”167 And 2% of males even
admitted to recent coercive acts like “pressuring people into sexual acts
by offering rewards or threatening retaliation.”168 The study concluded
that harassment is perpetrated by individuals across the political
spectrum, in all age groups, and at all wage levels.169
Other studies have had similar findings. For example, the American
Bar Association Journal and the Working Mother Institute performed a
survey of over 3,000 individuals in March 2018, on their experiences
with sexual harassment in the employment setting.170 A full 68% of
women who responded to the survey acknowledged personal exposure
to sexual harassment during employment.171 This survey also found that
30% of these same women actually reported the workplace harassment,
and slightly more than a quarter of the women, “reported [that their]
complaints about sexual harassment were taken seriously.”172 The study
also looked at male exposure and response to harassment,173 concluding
that “women and men see their organizations very differently, even
down to acknowledging that a problem exists.”174
164

Id.
Id. at 2.
166 Patel et al., supra note 19.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id.
170 Barbara Frankel & Stephanie Francis Ward, Little Agreement Between the Sexes on
Tackling Harassment, Working Mother/ABA Journal Survey Finds, A.B.A. J. (July 24, 2018,
6:10 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/tackling_harassment_survey_
women_men [https://perma.cc/RRP9-2PNR].
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See id. (“Of the male respondents, 19 percent reported that they had experienced
sexual harassment, and 42 percent indicated that their sexual harassment complaints
were taken seriously.”).
174 Id. The survey results specifically showed:
165
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In addition, the Edison Research group performed a national survey
of over 1,000 adults with respect to sexual harassment and found
similar results.175 Indeed, “[o]nly 32% of women agreed that the
harassment was something they could report to their employer without
fear . . . [and] [o]nly 30% of women strongly agree that their employer
handled the harassment situation properly.”176 Like the ABA study, the
results of this survey found strong concerns over reporting the
harassment and how it would be addressed by the employer.177 The
study further found sexual harassment across all age categories, as well
as across income levels.178 Those workers living in a household earning
less than $25,000 were less likely to report exposure to sexual
harassment during employment, however.179 Geographical differences
can also impact experiences with sexual harassment, and the study
concluded that employees “in rural communities and in the South are
more likely to experience sexual harassment at work.”180

Fifty-two percent of the women said they didn’t report their complaint
because it would negatively impact their job (versus 27 percent of the men);
47 percent of the women said the behavior was tolerated in their organization
(versus 30 percent of the men); and 45 percent of the women said they had
no confidence their senior leadership would address the issue (versus 24
percent of the men).
Id.
175 See EDISON RESEARCH, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: #METOO, WOMEN,
MEN, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 1 (2018), http://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/Sexual-Harassment-in-the-Workplace-metoo-Women-Men-and-theGig-Economy-6.20.18-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R98N-ZMTE] (discussing worker view
“that the harassment was not properly handled by their employers and had a negative
effect on their careers”).
176 Id. at 7.
177 See id.
178 The survey found “little difference between the higher income categories ($2550k, $50k-100k, and $100k or more).” Id. at 9.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 10. A number of studies have explored the prevalence of sexual harassment in
specific geographical areas. See, e.g., NICOLE E. JOHNS, ANITA RAJ, DAVID S. LEE & HOLLY
KEARL, MEASURING #METOO IN CALIFORNIA: A STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND
ASSAULT 8 (2019), http://www.calcasa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/
CAMeTooReport_052419.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZK6-4JPJ] (looking at harassment in the
state of California); UNITE HERE LOCAL 1, HANDS OFF, PANTS ON: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
CHICAGO’S HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY (2016), https://www.handsoffpantson.org/wpcontent/uploads/HandsOffReportWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT8D-YPFY] (examining
harassment in the hospitality industry in Chicago); Results: 2019 Workplace Harassment
Survey, MAINECANDO (2019), https://www.mecando.org/research.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2020) [https://perma.cc/K9TR-3HC6] (examining workplace harassment in Maine).
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Particular industries have also been studied for the likelihood of
sexual harassment. The Edison study discussed above examined
platform-based workers and found that “[t]he gig economy, where
workers participate in a series of short-term assignments or freelance
work as independent contractors, sees a much higher percentage
of . . . sexual harassment . . . [with] 30% report[ing] having been
harassed in the workplace, compared to 21% of the total population.”181
Other research has examined potential harassment in the fast food
industry.182 This survey focused specifically on non-managerial workers
in this industry, and looked only at women who were at least sixteen
years of age.183 The survey, which included over 1,200 females,
concluded that “[f]orty percent (40%) of women in the fast food
industry have experienced unwanted sexual behaviors on the job,
including 28% who have experienced multiple forms of harassment.”184
The types of harassment reported in the results included “unwanted
sexual teasing, jokes, remarks or questions (27%), unwanted hugging
or touching (26%), and unwanted questions about workers’ sexual
interests or information about others’ sexual interests (20%), with 2%
of women even reporting sexual assault or rape on the job.”185 Like
many of the other studies, this analysis also found that the harassment
often went unreported at work.186
The results of this study for fast food workers are truly startling, with
“one in eight” female employees exposed to “extensive sexual
harassment” but feeling “trapped and unable to leave.”187 A related
national study performed a survey involving hundreds of workers in the
restaurant industry.188 Again, the results in this specific type of

181

EDISON RESEARCH, supra note 175, at 3.
See HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., KEY FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF WOMEN FAST FOOD
WORKERS 1 (2016), https://hartresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Fast-FoodWorker-Survey-Memo-10-5-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL6S-JTK7].
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 “Forty percent (40%) of women who have been subjected to sexual harassment
at their fast food job report the behavior to their employer. Thirty-three (33%) percent
reported the behavior to a superior within their own store, while 5% reported it to
corporate headquarters or HR, and 2% called their company’s sexual harassment
hotline.” Id. at 3. This is most likely because “[m]any workers feel that they are on their
own when it comes to dealing with unwanted sexual behavior . . . [and] feel that they
have no choice but to put up with it.” Id.
187 Id. at 4.
188 THE REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED & FORWARD TOGETHER, THE GLASS FLOOR:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY 2 (Oct. 7, 2014),
182
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workplace revealed widespread harassment. The survey found that
extraordinarily high numbers of restaurant employees were subjected
to harassment “from restaurant management (66%), co-workers (80%),
and customers (78%).”189 Indeed, 30% of females in the study “reported
that being touched inappropriately was a common occurrence in their
restaurant.”190
There are numerous studies outside of the food industry as well. One
analysis performed by the National Park Service revealed that 10.4% of
over 9,000 employees responding to a survey reported having been
exposed to sexual harassment, with 19.3% of workers reporting gender
harassment.191 And still other recent reports (detailed in the notes
below) have summarized testimony, research and data demonstrating
the prevalence of harassment in the U.S workplace.192
https://forwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/The-Glass-Floor-Sexual-Harassmentin-the-Restaurant-Industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ACD-TB7Q].
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 NAT’L PARK SERV., 2017 WORK ENVIRONMENT SURVEY TECHNICAL REPORT, at ii-iii
(2017), https://www.nps.gov/aboutus/upload/NPS-WES-Technical-Report-20170929Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWA7-4RQ3]. Interestingly, the study provided:
Meta-analytic results suggest that anywhere between 24%-84% of women
report having experienced sexual harassment in the U.S. workplace; among
private sector organizations these rates range from 24%-58%; and within
governmental organizations their rates range from 31%-43%. Direct
comparison involving rates of harassment and/or assault behaviors to other
studies and organizations must be made with due considerations to
methodological (e.g., assessment approach – direct vs. indirect assessment of
harassing and/or assault behaviors; sampling strategies, and weighting
procedures used to estimate rates), and contextual/organizational factors (e.g.,
academic, private, military, and government organizations).
Id. at iii n.3 (citation omitted).
192 See, e.g., Heather Antecol, Vanessa E. Barcus & Deborah Cobb-Clark, GenderBiased Behavior at Work: Exploring the Relationship Between Sexual Harassment and Sex
Discrimination, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 782, 784-85 (2009) (“[A previous 1999 study], for
example, concludes that the enormous disparity in the estimated proportion of women
experiencing sexual harassment at some point in their lifetime (from 16% to 90%) is
attributable in some part to survey measurement issues . . . Moreover, there is a great
deal of ambiguity about what constitutes sexual harassment making the exact phrasing
of survey questions important. While many women report experiencing unwanted
sexual behavior, they often do not label their experiences as sexual harassment per se
. . . [Using] data drawn from the 2002 General Social Survey . . . [which is] the only
data set . . . that includes detailed questions on overall job satisfaction, a respondent’s
intentions to quit their current job, and whether respondents have experienced sex
discrimination and/or sexual harassment.” (citations omitted)); Tanya Kateri
Hernandez, Sexual Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender
and Race, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 189 (2001) (“Thus, given the known difficulties
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The governmental data gathered by the EEOC further demonstrates
that the fact of sexual harassment continues to be a pervasive problem
in our society. The prevalence of sex-based claims generally is startling,
with a large percentage of the charges of harassment filed with the
EEOC involving a sex component.193 Indeed, the number of harassment
claims involving sex increased by over 13% during fiscal year 2018. And

of pursuing a sexual harassment claim, using EEOC charge statistics and federal court
sexual harassment allegations as a rough indicator of the existing patterns of sexual
harassment in society may very well underestimate rather than overestimate the actual
rate of sexual harassment.”); Joni Hersch & Beverly Moran, He Said, She Said, Let’s Hear
What the Data Say: Sexual Harassment in the Media, Courts, EEOC, and Social Science,
101 KY. L.J. 753, 765 (2013) (“Yet, estimates of the prevalence of sexual harassment
vary considerably even among studies based on representative samples. Further, very
few sexual harassment studies have been conducted recently.”); Nancy Krieger, Pamela
D. Waterman, Cathy Hartman, Lisa M. Bates, Anne M. Stoddard, Margaret M. Quinn,
Glorian Sorensen & Elizabeth M. Barbeau, Social Hazards on the Job: Workplace Abuse,
Sexual Harassment, and Racial Discrimination — A Study of Black, Latino, and White LowIncome Women and Men Workers in the United States, 36 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 51, 51
(2006) (noting that “[s]exual harassment at work in the past year was reported by 26
percent of the women and 22 percent of the men” in a study of “1,202 predominately
black, Latino, and white women and men low-income union workers in the Greater
Boston area”); Heather McLaughlin, Christopher Uggen & Amy Blackstone, Sexual
Harassment, Workplace Authority, and the Paradox of Power, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 625, 628
(2012) (explaining “why and how gender, sex, and power shape harassment
experiences and workplace interactions more broadly”); Testimony of Fatima Goss
Graves Vice President for Education and Employment National Women’s Law Center, U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-1415/graves.cfm#sdendnote10sym (last visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UP35G6TP] (“Sexual harassment remains a serious problem affecting one out of every four
working women in the United States, and particularly for women in some of the lowest
paid fields and those in many high-wage, traditionally male fields, there are consistent
reports of sexual harassment that go unaddressed.”); Women in the American Workforce,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/
american_experiences/women.cfm (last visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9G6MBTKH] (“We heard testimony that one in four women face harassment in the workplace,
and many are loath to report it.”).
193 See ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH, M. PHIL. & CYNTHIA HESS, INST. FOR WOMEN’S
POLICY RESEARCH, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT WORK: UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS
2 (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/IWPR-sexual-harassmentbrief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST4L-C9VC]. See generally Charges Alleging SexBased Harassment (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charges-alleging-sex-basedharassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-2019 (last visited Feb. 3, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/5XB3-SU6M].
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the government initiated over forty lawsuits against businesses alleging
sexual harassment during this time.194
It is common for the government to receive thousands of charges
involving workplace harassment, with over 12,500 in the most recent
fiscal year alone.195 The number of cases where the EEOC finds cause
varies, but was between 3.0% and 7.6% during fiscal years 2010–
2019.196 In pure numerical terms, this means that the government finds
cause to believe that workplace harassment occurs hundreds of times
each year in varied employment settings across the country.197
These numbers have also translated into large monetary recoveries.
During fiscal year 2018, the government recovered $68.2 million for
victims of harassment.198 And, “[i]n appeals of sexual harassment cases
involving federal employees, awards increased by more than 180
percent . . . .”199 In one high profile recent case, ride sharing giant Uber
agreed to settle a claim with the EEOC that alleged widespread sexual
harassment by establishing a $4.4 million fund for current and former
workers.200
4.

Private Litigation Statistics

Beyond the government, private sexual harassment litigation has also
proven successful during this same timeframe. For example, a jury
recently awarded $11 million to two female workers who were retaliated
against after complaining of inappropriate sexual comments and

194 What You Should Know: EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/
preventing-workplace-harassment.cfm (last visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
E2D6-B69K] [hereinafter What You Should Know].
195 See Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
7VZY-QU5X].
196 See All Charges Alleging Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2019,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/all_harassment.cfm (last visited July 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Z55TDVXX].
197 See id.
198 What You Should Know, supra note 194.
199 Id.
200 Kate Conger, Uber Settles Federal Investigation into Workplace Culture, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/technology/uber-settles-eeocinvestigation-workplace-culture.html [https://perma.cc/AGJ2-QMNT].
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touching by their manager.201 In a similar case, an employee was
recently awarded $3 million by a jury where the worker was offered job
benefits in exchange for sexual favors.202 In yet another recent case, a
female firefighter was awarded over $3 million after she reported
sexually hostile comments and pranks, and was subsequently
terminated.203
This is just a small sampling of the cases, and there are numerous
other examples that also exist where a jury has recently returned a large
verdict in a case alleging, at least in part, sexual harassment or improper
sexual conduct.204 There have also been a substantially large number of
recent reported settlements in these cases.205 In perhaps the most high
201 See Jury Verdict, Meadowcroft v. Silverton Partners Inc., No. BC633239 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2018), 2018 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 36835.
202 See Jury Verdict, Roosa v. Cent. Motors, Inc. of Norwood, No. 16-2369 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018), 2019 MA Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS 2.
203 See Jury Verdict, Morningstar v. Circleville Fire Dep’t, No. 2:15-3077 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 22, 2018), 2018 Federal Jury Verdicts Rptr. LEXIS 149.
204 See, e.g., Jury Verdict, Mayo-Coleman v. American Sugar Holding, Inc., No. 14cv-79 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2018), 2018 NY Jury Verdicts Review LEXIS 58 ($13,400,000
jury award); Jury Verdict, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Aaron Rents, Inc., No.
3:08-cv-00683 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2012), 2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 3682 ($95 million
jury award); Jury Verdict, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Moreno Farms,
Inc., No. 1:14-cv-23181 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2015), 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 7389
($17.4 million jury award); Jury Verdict, Rennenger v. Manley Toy Direct LLC, No.
4:10-cv-00400 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 5, 2015), 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 7326 (“Iowa Federal
Jury Awards Over $11 Million To Female Customer Service Representative On Her
Sexual Harassment Claims Against Toy Company.”); Jury Verdict, Bouveng v. NYG
Capital LLC, No. 1:14-cv-05474 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015), 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
4689 (“New York Federal Jury Awards Over $18 Million To Former Employee In
Retaliation And Defamation Action Alleging CEO Fired Her And Defamed Her In
Articles After She Resisted His Sexual Advances.”); Jury Verdict, Robertson v. Hunter
Panels LLC, No. 2:13-cv-01047 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2015), 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
2892 (providing a jury award of $13,420,000 where the “[employers] discriminated
against [the employee] because of her gender, . . . subjected her to a hostile work
environment because of her gender, and . . . unlawfully retaliated against her when they
terminated her employment”); Jury Verdict, Taylor v. David, No. BC640925 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2019), 2019 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 11865 ($4.6 million jury award);
Jury Verdict, Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp., No. BC401746 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2018),
2018 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 8819 ($6 million jury award); Jury Verdict, Hudson v. Beverly
Fabrics, Inc., No. CV182035 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2018), 2018 Jury Verdicts LEXIS
1829 ($2.6 million jury award).
205 See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Alorica, Inc., No. 17-1270
(E.D.C.A. July 31, 2018), 2018 LexisNexis Jury Verdicts & Settlements 59 ($3.5 million
settlement); Flash Market to Pay $100,000 to Settle EEOC Sexual Harassment and
Retaliation Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-29-19a.cfm [https://perma.cc/6QBN5K6F] ($100,000 settlement); Pancake Chain IHOP to Pay $700,000 to Settle Sexual
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profile of such settlements, former Fox News anchor, Gretchen Carlson,
settled a case involving egregious sexual harassment by the chairman
and CEO of the company, Roger Ailes, for $20 million.206 In another
recent, high-profile settlement, Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein
came to a $25 million agreement with over thirty women who had
raised sexual misconduct allegations against him.207 Obviously, many
settlements go unreported in claims involving sexual harassment, where
companies often try to avoid any negative publicity through arbitration
clauses or nondisclosure agreements.
B. News Media and Other Reports
While not as persuasive as empirical social science research or
governmental data, numerous media reports have revealed the extent of
the sexual harassment problem. Of the more notable and high-profile
news stories, a New York Times piece detailed the account of a former
engineer at ride-sharing giant Uber, who sued the company alleging that
the business improperly responded to complaints of sexually harassing
conduct.208 Another New York Times report examined allegations of
sexual harassment in the front office of the Dallas Mavericks, which
resulted in a $10 million payment.209 And, Bloomberg recently reported

Harassment and Retaliation Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Feb. 20,
2019), https://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-20-19.cfm [https://perma.cc/
FXD6-AFJ5] ($700,000 settlement); Sys-Con, LLC to Pay $70,000 to Settle Sexual
Harassment Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-11-19a.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZN294CHQ] ($70,000 settlement).
206 See Jury Verdict, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2018), 2016
Jury Verdicts LEXIS 6653.
207 Deanna Paul, Harvey Weinstein May Have Arranged a $25 Million Settlement, But
He Still Faces Criminal Charges, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 6:37 AM PST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2019/12/14/harvey-weinstein-mayhave-arranged-million-settlement-he-still-faces-criminal-charges/ [https://perma.cc/X7MKUP9X].
208 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Former Uber Engineer’s Lawsuit Claims Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/technology/ubersexual-harassment-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/BZF2-K9PJ].
209 Scott Cacciola, Mavericks and Mark Cuban Sanctioned by N.B.A. Over Handling of
Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/
sports/mark-cuban-mavericks-nba.html [https://perma.cc/W58M-D7JK]; cf. Jacob
Bogage, NBA, Kings Drop Luke Walton Sexual Assault Investigation, Cite Insufficient
Evidence, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/
2019/08/23/nba-kings-drop-luke-walton-sexual-assault-investigation-cite-insufficientevidence/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/22RK-KB9J] (discussing investigation of
sexual conduct in the NBA).
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on the termination of Barnes and Noble’s CEO as a result of a sexual
harassment complaint by a company employee.210 Presidential
candidates have also raised sexual harassment as an issue of important
concern — in one instance joining McDonald’s workers to protest the
company’s treatment of hostile work environment claims.211 And of
course, in the #MeToo era, the news has been routinely flooded in
recent months with stories of the inappropriate sexual conduct of highprofile individuals.212 While all anecdotal, these reports nonetheless
lend support to the argument that sexual harassment remains a
pervasive problem, and the media has helped raise public awareness of
this ongoing issue.
Indeed, there has even been a discussion in the media of the so-called
concern over a #MeToo backlash against men, a concern that males will
too carefully guard their behavior to prevent allegations against them.213
Researchers in 2019 found that 27% of male workers “avoided one-on-

210 Matthew Townsend, Barnes & Noble Details Alleged Harassment by Ousted CEO,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:29 PM PDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-10-30/barnes-noble-lays-out-alleged-sexual-harassment-of-fired-ceo
[https://perma.cc/487X-48KJ].
211 Yuki Noguchi, Protests Over Sexual Harassment at McDonald’s Grow as Shareholders
Meet, NPR (May 23, 2019, 6:13 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/23/
726071587/mcdonalds-protests-over-sexual-harassment-grow-as-shareholders-meet
[https://perma.cc/B4XE-75XX].
212 See, e.g., Emily Cochrane, Negotiators Strike Deal to Tighten Sexual Harassment
Rules on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/
us/politics/sexual-harassment-capitol-hill.html [https://perma.cc/E643-GD6G] (“The
move toward tougher standards began this year after multiple lawmakers resigned amid
accusations of sexual misconduct and taxpayer-funded settlements.”); John Koblin, The
Year of Reckoning at CBS: Sexual Harassment Allegations and Attempts to Cover Them Up,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/business/media/cbssexual-harassment-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/XP4K-6XYT] (“Three powerful men
at [CBS] — Leslie Moonves, its chief executive; Charlie Rose, its morning show anchor;
and Jeff Fager, the executive producer of “60 Minutes” — have all lost their jobs because
of workplace conduct.”); Google Paid $35 Million to Former Executive Accused of Sexual
Harassment, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/google-paid-35million-former-executive-amit-singhal-accused-sexual-harassment/
[https://perma.cc/PZ9T-X5RQ] (“Google paid former search executive Amit Singhal
$35 million in an exit package when he was reportedly forced to resign after a sexual
assault investigation . . . .”); see also Christopher Mele, Sexual Assault on Flights:
Experts Recommend Ways to Stay Safe and Combat It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/travel/airline-flights-sexual-assault.html
[https://perma.cc/F4BF-KX7N] (“Airplanes, with their cramped quarters and crowded
conditions, would seem improbable settings for sexual assaults, but recent news
accounts show they do happen.”).
213 See Tim Bower, The #MeToo Backlash, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/09/the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/5YQ2-T85N].
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one meetings with female colleagues” in an effort to reduce potential
exposure to sexual harassment allegations.214 And, there has been a
recent focus on the potential defamation suits some women have faced
after making sexual harassment allegations.215
III. A NEW MODEL
The social science research, governmental data, litigation statistics
and other information discussed above paint a clear picture of the
ongoing nature of sexual harassment in the workplace. Properly placing
this information before the federal courts, however, is a much more
difficult endeavor. While it is true that any individual claim of sexual
harassment is itself plausible, litigants must be cautious in how they
present the fact of harassment to a particular court. This Part outlines a
new model for bringing claims of sexual harassment in the workplace
under Title VII, detailing the specifics of the proposed framework in
this Article.
The framework proposed by this Article relies on the pleading
requirements of the federal rules.216 It is thus important to have a clear
understanding of the precise mechanism under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that can be used to share the relevant social science data
and other harassment-related information with the federal courts.
Fortunately, there is a relatively straightforward approach to attaching
this type of information to a federal complaint, which is specifically
authorized under Rule 10(c).

214

Id.
See, e.g., Kara Fox & Antoine Crouin, Men Are Suing Women Who Accused Them
of Harassment. Will It Stop Others from Speaking Out?, CNN (June 5, 2019, 4:24 PM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/05/europe/metoo-defamation-trials-sandra-mullerfrance-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q79U-M56U ] (“A series of high-profile
defamation cases have been brought against women in response to the outpouring of
sexual misconduct allegations in the wake of #MeToo, and women’s rights activists say
they could have a chilling effect on the movement’s future.”); Sui-Lee Wee & Li Yuan,
They Said #MeToo. Now They Are Being Sued., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/business/china-sexual-harassment-metoo.html
[https://perma.cc/XGX2-AJHV] (“As the #MeToo movement has spread, men in the
United States, in France, in India and elsewhere have turned to the courts, sometimes
successfully arguing that they were defamed by their accusers or by the media.”).
216 See generally Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing similar, broader framework for
Title VII litigation).
215
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A. Rule 10(c)
The most straightforward way of presenting social science data on
sexual harassment to the federal courts would be attaching such
information to the complaint in the case. Indeed, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permit the attachment of documents to a pleading in
certain specified situations. More precisely, including documents along
with the complaint can be accomplished through Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 10(c). That Rule provides:
Adoption by Reference; Exhibits . . .
A statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference
elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or
motion. A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.217
Thus, the federal rules specifically provide for the attachment of
documents to the complaint, and the courts have consistently
interpreted this provision of the rules to allow for such attachments.218
The two necessary critical components for attaching this type of
“written instrument”219 are that the attachment must be specifically
referenced in the complaint, and the document must be central to the
allegations.220

217

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).
See, e.g., L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted) (“[T]he court considers ‘the complaint, the answer, any written
documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice
for the factual background of the case.’ ‘A complaint is [also] deemed to include any
written instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference,
and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the
complaint.’”); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., No.
11 Civ. 0505, 2011 WL 2610661, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011) (“[T]his Court may
consider the full text of documents that are quoted in or attached to the complaint, or
documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about and relied upon in bringing
the suit.”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1326 (4th ed. 2020); Aimee Woodward Brown, Pleading in Technicolor:
When Can Litigants Incorporate Audiovisual Works into their Complaints?, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1269, 1269-70 (2013) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007)) (discussing why courts should additionally “examine ‘documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice,’ in addition to the complaint in its entirety”).
219 FED. RULE CIV. P. 10(c).
220 Brown, supra note 218, at 1274 (first citing Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data
Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993); and then citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v.
Sum Holding LP, 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991)) (permitting documents to be
218
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The federal courts and procedural rules thus provide a basic
framework for attaching documents to a complaint, explaining when
such attachments are appropriate.221 The lower courts have more fully
explored when these types of attachments are allowed, looking to the
circumstances of the particular case. Some courts have applied a more
relaxed interpretation of Rule 10(c) to employment discrimination
cases, permitting attachments to be considered as part of the allegations
of workplace discrimination.
For example, in the employment discrimination context, many courts
have allowed plaintiffs to attach the charge of discrimination (initially
filed with the EEOC) to the complaint. In Blazek v. United States
Cellular Corp., the federal court permitted the attachment of a state
administrative charge form to the complaint222 in a workplace
discrimination suit.223 Looking to the case law in other jurisdictions, as
well as its own, the court noted that “[c]ourts have specifically held that
an administrative charge, attached to a complaint, is considered part of
the pleading for Rule 10(c) purposes and the factual allegations therein
may be considered in determining whether or not the complaint states
a claim.”224 The court therefore concluded that the charge in this case,
which included allegations of sexual harassment, could “undeniably
[be] ‘attached to the pleadings’ as an exhibit.”225 This result is consistent
with how many other courts have ruled on the issue.226
With respect to attaching supporting information to sexual
harassment claims specifically, the courts have generally been
“incorporated by reference if they are ‘referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are
central to her claim’”).
221 Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding LP, 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991); Brown,
supra note 218, at 1274.
222 Blazek v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1017 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
223 Id. at 1006.
224 Id. at 1016 (first citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2001);
then citing Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1995); and then
citing Danik v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 396 F. Appx. 15, 16 (4th Cir. 2010)).
225 Id. at 1017 (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir.
2010)).
226 See, e.g., Mays v. Bd. of Comm’rs Port of New Orleans, No. 14-1014, 2015 WL
4097109, at *1, *5 (E.D. La. July 6, 2015) (allowing state discrimination charge to be
attached under rule 10(c) in harassment case and noting Fifth Circuit approach that
when “a plaintiff attaches and fully incorporates an EEOC Charge into his complaint, it
becomes part of his complaint for all purposes”); see also Evans v. Md. State Highway
Admin., No. JKB-18-935, 2018 WL 4733159, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2018) (allowing
attachment of charge of discrimination to federal complaint); Ewing v. Moore, No. 7:17cv-00743, 2018 WL 282297, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2018) (same); McDaniel v. Elgin,
No. 209-CV-119, 2010 WL 339082, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2010) (same).
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permissive where the materials are referenced in the complaint and
central to the allegations. For example, in Gagliano v. Cytrade Financial,
LLC,227 the court looked at whether an employment agreement could
be attached to the complaint in a case involving allegations of sexual
harassment.228 The court concluded that the agreement should be
allowed, holding that the document was central to the allegations
involved.229
Similarly, in Williams v. Pennridge School District,230 another federal
court considered whether the handwritten notes of the alleged victim’s
mother — which detailed and catalogued the incidents of sexual
harassment — could be attached under Rule 10(c).231 The court
specifically incorporated this document into the complaint in ruling on
the defendant’s motion for dismissal.232
Plaintiffs can go too far in trying to attach various items to the
complaint, however, and must make sure that the information is central
to the allegations involved. For example, in Perkins v. Silverstein,233 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected certain documents that an
employment discrimination plaintiff sought to attach under Rule
10(c).234 The court held that “newspaper articles, commentaries,
cartoons, and miscellaneous other exhibits” were not appropriately
before the court as they were “not the type of documentary evidence or
‘written instruments’ which [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 10(c)
intended to be incorporated into, and made a part of the complaint.”235
There is not enough caselaw in this area to specifically quantify and
detail the exact types of documents permitted under Rule 10(c) in
employment discrimination and sexual harassment cases. Generally
speaking, however, where the attachments are central to the claim, and
where the plaintiff does not overreach, the additional documents have
largely been permitted by the courts.236
227

No. 09-4185, 2009 WL 3366975 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2009).
See id. at *2.
229 Id.
230 Civil Action No. 15-4163, 2016 WL 6432906 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2016).
231 See id. at *2, *4.
232 See id. at *4.
233 Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1991).
234 See id. at 467.
235 Id. at 467 & n.2.
236 In an interesting (and related) decision, a magistrate judge recommended that
references to sexual harassment statistics and research (which included hyperlinks)
should be struck from a federal complaint. See Nabors v. Lewis, No. 6:17-2887, 2018
WL 7118008, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). The magistrate judge found the
information immaterial to the case. Id. at *3.
228
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B. The Proposed Framework
In essence, the courts have held that information relevant to a sexual
harassment complaint can properly be attached to the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 10(c).237 Certainly, individual courts may be more or
less permissive as to these attachments, but this broad general rule
seems applicable to workplace harassment claims.
As shown by the current social science research on sexual
harassment, governmental data, litigation statistics, and other
information, harassment in the workplace is a persistent problem. It
seems appropriate, then, that when litigating these cases, the courts
should take a relaxed view of the claims and hesitate before rejecting a
case too early in the proceedings. As seen above, however, the
plausibility standard has had a particularly negative impact on
employment discrimination plaintiffs when bringing claims. Indeed,
there have been numerous instances of the federal courts applying an
overly rigid pleading standard to sexual harassment cases after Twombly
and Iqbal.238
Much of the problem with the plausibility standard for pleading is
that it creates a subjective standard for the courts to apply. This is
particularly troublesome for many civil rights plaintiffs who often face
an uphill battle in establishing those claims. Employment
discrimination victims, who must also prove intent, face an additional
hurdle in these cases. The existing uncertainty and difficulty in bringing
these claims is unnecessary. As seen in the studies and analyses
performed by countless independent groups and researchers, sexual
237 See Giambra v. Zeller Corp., No. 11-CV-6308, 2014 WL 2519740, at *5
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Complaint with the New York State Division of Human
Rights (‘NYDHR’) alleging that [the plaintiff] suffered ‘sexual harassment/hostile
workplace’ [was attached to the complaint].”); Blazek v. U.S. Cellular Corp., 937 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1017 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (indicating that the court allowed plaintiff to
“incorporate the allegations in her administrative charge by reference as part of her
pleading of factual allegations to support the substance of her sexual harassment and
retaliation claims”); Delk v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 615, 621 (W.D.N.C.
2002) (allowing attachment of EEOC complaint claiming, in part, harassment); see also
Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (noting
attachment of investigation documents to the complaint), aff’d, 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir.
2019). See generally Bates v. City of Bristol, No. 3:17-CV-01066, 2018 WL 1472523, at
*3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2018) (considering documents attached to the complaint when
evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion); Alex v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 1:12-CV-1021, 2014 WL
12754934, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (same), on reconsideration in part, No. 1:12CV-1021, 2014 WL 2510561 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2014); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
218, § 1326 (discussing adoption pursuant to Rule 10(c)).
238 See supra Part I (discussing application of plausibility standard to sexual
harassment claims by federal courts).
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harassment is a fact. Any individual claim of sexual harassment should
thus be considered plausible on its face, and allowed to advance to
discovery with the employer. Twombly and Iqbal, then, should be
considered largely irrelevant for claims of harassment, as plausibility is
no longer at issue in this subset of workplace cases.
There are two major caveats to this argument that are worth noting.
First, the statement that a claim of harassment should generally survive
dismissal does not equate with the conclusion that the claim will
eventually survive summary judgment, let alone be victorious at trial.
Indeed, the argument here is simply that — given our vast knowledge
of persistent harassment in the workplace — any specific claim brought
on this basis should be plausible enough to allow the worker access to
discovery and the documentation and information often in the
employer’s exclusive control. Second, the argument here is not
necessarily that all claims of sexual harassment should survive
dismissal. Rather, as detailed below, the employer should be given the
opportunity to explain why the facts of a particular case present the
unusual situation where plausibility does not exist, and the case should
be dismissed.
Given these caveats, it is important to consider how the relevant
information and studies discussed above should be presented to the
federal courts, and how sexual harassment claims should generally be
treated in litigation. This Part provides a new model for all sexual
harassment claims that can be used in cases brought under Title VII.
This model is not intended to serve as an exclusive approach to bringing
these cases, but it rather provides a helpful framework to be considered
when litigating harassment claims. This framework can be broken down
into four discrete parts:
1. The complaint should state that the plaintiff was subjected
to severe or pervasive harassment in the workplace that is
imputable to the employer.
2. The complaint should state the general fact of pervasive
workplace sexual harassment in our society.
3. The complaint should attach, under Rule 10(c), the relevant
social science research studies, governmental data, and
litigation statistics supporting the fact of harassment.
4. The employer should be given an opportunity to rebut the
fact of sexual harassment.
Each part of this proposed framework will be discussed in turn below.
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Alleging Elements of Harassment. As discussed earlier, the Supreme
Court has clearly articulated the standards necessary to establish a Title
VII harassment claim.239 More specifically, harassment can be defined
as improper conduct that occurs because of sex, is unwelcome, and is
both objectively and subjectively severe or pervasive.240 The plaintiff in
the case should clearly state that she has been subjected to this type of
conduct, and provide any additional factual detail to support these
elements.241 The facts will obviously vary substantially depending upon
the particular case, but could include any acts by the employer that are
sexual in nature or derogatory toward women, as well as any efforts the
plaintiff may have made to complain about the conduct. The plaintiff
here should provide specific factual detail about these events, including
as appropriate, the names and titles of those involved, and the
dates/times of the occurrences.
The plaintiff must also assert that this conduct is imputable to the
employer. Thus, the plaintiff could state that a supervisor was involved
in the harassment, or that a co-worker was involved and that the
employer knew (or should have known) of the acts but failed to
respond. The Supreme Court has clearly articulated that agency
principles must be followed to impute harassment to the employer, and
the plaintiff should thus articulate any facts here that would help
support the employer’s liability.242 This would include any facts
showing that a supervisor was directly involved in the conduct, that the
employer was aware of a co-worker’s improper conduct, and/or that the
239 See supra Part I (discussing elements of sexual harassment claim brought in
federal court). See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (setting
forth elements of workplace sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII); Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (same); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986) (same).
240 See Meritor, 477 U.S. 57; supra Part I.A. See generally Gerald v. Univ. of P.R., 707
F.3d 7, 17-19 (1st Cir. 2013) (“To prevail on a hostile work environment sexual
harassment claim, a plaintiff must establish in essence: (1) membership in a protected
class and (2) unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) which was based on sex, (4) was
sufficiently severe or pervasive, (5) was objectively and subjectively offensive, and
finally (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established.” (citing Forrest
v. Brinker Int’l Payroll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 228 (1st Cir. 2007))); Burlington Indus., 524
U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
241 See supra Part I.B. See generally Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524
U.S. 775; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff
must plead and ultimately prove Title VII’s statutory requirement that there be
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”); Meritor, 477 U.S. 57.
242 See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 754-58 (applying agency principles to question
of whether sexual harassment liability should be imputed to the employer); Faragher,
524 U.S. at 784 (same); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
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employer failed to take proper measures to prevent the harassment or
to appropriately respond to a complaint.
Alleging the Harassment Fact. The second element of the proposed
framework is the most easily identifiable. In any harassment complaint
brought under Title VII, the plaintiff should allege that sexual
harassment is a fact in our society, and that it occurs every day in
workplaces across the country. As an undeniable fact, harassment can
thus properly be alleged in the complaint.
Attaching Social Science Studies. The third stage of the proposed
pleading framework requires the plaintiff to reference and attach any
relevant social science research, studies, governmental data, or litigation
statistics that support the allegation that harassment is a fact in our
society. As discussed earlier, this information can properly be attached
to the complaint under Rule 10(c) where it is referenced in the
complaint itself and central to the allegations involved. As the claim at
issue would involve harassment under Title VII, information related to
ongoing harassment in our society would be directly central to the
allegations in the complaint.
To further bolster these allegations, the plaintiff should attempt to
attach studies and analyses that are performed in geographical areas as
close in proximity to the workplace involved as possible, as well as
studies that may be directly related to the industry involved. While
broad national studies performed on sexual harassment are
undoubtedly powerful, research directly related to the particular
industry and in the same geographical area as the employer implicated
in the case can be particularly persuasive.
Thus, to properly satisfy this third element of the proposed
framework, the plaintiff should reference the social science studies and
other relevant data supporting harassment, and attach this information
to the complaint where possible. The plaintiff should further make these
attachments as relevant to the particular industry, company, and
geographical area involved as possible. As relevant information
referenced in the complaint and central to the allegations, these
attachments would thus satisfy the requirements found under Rule
10(c).
Employer Rebuttal. The proposed framework does not establish a per
se rule that all claims of sexual harassment should survive dismissal.
Rather, it is an acknowledgment that — given the overwhelming
evidence of this type of misconduct in the workplace — the vast
majority of sexual harassment claims should proceed to discovery.
Employees should thus typically be allowed to gather sufficient
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evidence from the employer for a judge to then determine whether the
case is strong enough to go to trial.
There will nonetheless be instances where dismissal in a Title VII case
is appropriate, and employers should be given the opportunity to
explain why the facts of the case present the unusual circumstance
where the harassment claim should be rejected early in the proceeding.
Employers should thus be given a formal opportunity to rebut the
allegations in support of a dismissal motion.
While most claims of sexual harassment are at least plausible, there
will undoubtedly be numerous instances where plaintiffs bring claims
that are appropriate for dismissal. For example, the particular case at
issue may present a plaintiff who has previously made frivolous and
unsubstantiated claims against the employer.243 Or, it is possible that
the plaintiff may not have followed the necessary administrative
prerequisites to bring a plausible claim.244 Or, the time limits on the

243 Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1202 (2014) (“[I]n an ideal procedural system frivolous
claims are not successful. Nor should frivolous claims proceed to trial. And they
typically should be resolved before summary judgment and discovery. The hardest line
to draw, however, may be between frivolous claims and those that do not meet a prediscovery threshold. . . . Many, if not all, frivolous complaints will not state a claim for
relief, but a complaint that fails to state a claim is not by definition frivolous.” (footnote
omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989))). Compare Greene v.
Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (denying summary judgment despite
the fact that plaintiff “had in the past filed a number of frivolous sexual harassment
complaints”), with Reid v. Insuramerica Corp., No. 1:06-CV-1039, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105360, at *32 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2007) (“Plaintiff’s sexual harassment and
retaliation claims were frivolous, and the maintenance of this lawsuit in the face of such
frivolous claims amounted to bad faith.”).
244 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year . . . .”); see also, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006)
(“[T]he threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a
plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.”); Norris v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d
402, 417 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, No. 12-5288, 2013 WL 1733645 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2013)
(“All of the plaintiff’s claims arising from the EEOC proceedings must be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely manner . . . . Under Title VII, a
plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies.” (citation omitted) (first citing Peters
v. District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 180; and then citing McKeithan v.
Boarman, 803 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 n.3 (D.D.C. 2011))). See generally Pamela A. Mann,
Federalism Issues and Title VII: Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 413-14 (1984-85).
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harassment claim (which, at most are 300 days from the last incident of
discriminatory harassment),245 may have already run.246
It is impossible to list all possible reasons that would justify dismissal
in a harassment case, and these represent just a few examples.247 The
employer should properly be allowed to show that there is a reason that
makes the allegation implausible. Given the overwhelming evidence of
ongoing harassment in the workplace, however, the employer will likely
only be able to satisfy this rebuttal burden in a minority of cases.
Nonetheless, giving the employer the opportunity to make this showing
is a critical part of the analysis.
C. Example of Proposed Framework
The four elements of the proposed test are straightforward and easily
applied. It may be useful, however, to examine how these particular
elements would come together. For example, a typical individual claim
of sexual harassment might involve allegations that a worker at a fast
food restaurant in a small town was exposed to improper touching and
comments by customers, and the restaurant took no action when they
were informed of the conduct. This is the exact common type of
harassment claim anticipated by this framework. Applying the
framework set forth above, the proposed model would proceed with the
plaintiff alleging the following:

245 See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 103 (2002) (discussing
time limits for filing employment discrimination claims and harassment claims under
Title VII).
246 See, e.g., Ismail v. Univ. of Portland, No. 00-35354, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 33648,
at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2000) (“Because the [sexual harassment] complaint admitted
that the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit had not been met due to untimeliness, and
because the same claim had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
Ismail’s prior action, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
action without leave to amend.” (first citing Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170,
1176 (9th Cir. 2000); and then citing Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.
1986))).
247 Cf. Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has It Gone Too Far, or Has the
Media?, 8 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 351, 366-67 (1999) (“The common perception
based on the cases the media chooses to report is that most sexual harassment cases
being brought are frivolous. While frivolous claims are possible in any area of the law,
the number of frivolous sexual harassment lawsuits is actually lower than the media
would have us think. Frivolous harassment claims are minimal because of the economic
and emotional cost of bringing a lawsuit and because of the effects such drastic action
has on an employee’s life.” (footnote omitted)).
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Between January 10, 2020, and January 10, 2021, the plaintiff
was exposed to improper sexual comments and sexual touching
by customers, and the restaurant took no action despite the
repeated complaints of the employee. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is a fact in our country generally and in the town of
Canton, Georgia, where these allegations take place. This fact is
supported by the social science research, surveys, governmental
data, and litigation statistics. [Attached to this complaint
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c)].
The corresponding attachments to the complaint could include some
of the most recent social science research discussed in this Article. More
specific to this hypothetical case, the attachments could include the
analysis performed showing the strong prevalence of sexual harassment
in the fast food industry.248 Additionally, the attachments could also
include the research establishing that sexual harassment is particularly
prevalent in rural Southern communities, like the one implicated in the
complaint.249 The most recent EEOC statistics could further be attached
to the complaint, showing the commonality of harassment claims. And,
any litigation statistics relevant to the particular restaurant, industry, or
geographical area could also be attached.
This example thus demonstrates the relative ease of pleading a claim
of harassment, and also shows the type of information that could be
attached to the complaint.250 It is more than plausible to believe that a
fast food worker in this particular region was harassed in the workplace.
The employer would still have the opportunity to rebut the
allegations, however. For example, perhaps the employer could support
a dismissal motion on the basis that the business was too small to be
covered by Title VII.251 If the employer is unable to meet its rebuttal
burden, however, the plaintiff would be allowed to gather further
evidence in discovery and the case would proceed like any other federal
civil claim.
248 See HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 182, at 1 (noting high percentage of
women subjected to “unwanted sexual behaviors” in the fast food industry).
249 See EDISON RESEARCH, supra note 175, at 10 (finding sexual harassment more
common “in rural communities and in the South”).
250 Cf. Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing application of similar, broader framework
for Title VII litigation).
251 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . . “). See
generally Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 509-16 (2006) (“The dispute now
before us concerns the proper classification of Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered
employers to those with 15 or more employees.”).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The analytical framework proposed here simply acknowledges one
basic fact: sexual harassment is so common in the workplace that any
individual claim is at least plausible, unless proven otherwise. The
proposed framework provides one straightforward way for plaintiffs to
plead this fact of harassment pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Adopting the pleading model proposed here for sexual
harassment claims would have numerous implications, which are more
fully considered in this Part. It is worth exploring some of the potential
benefits and drawbacks of this particular framework.
One of the primary benefits of the proposed model is the educational
function that it provides.252 As discussed throughout this Article, there
is overwhelming support for the existence of the fact of harassment —
through studies, governmental data, and existing litigation.253 Many
judges and parties may simply be unaware of the prevalence of this
information. Most judges likely do not specialize in employment
discrimination claims, so providing this information to a court allows
the judge to be more fully informed of the frequency of this type of
harassment in a particular industry and geographical region. The
educational function and importance of this information is thus
substantial. Too often parties become overly entrenched in their area of
the law and lose sight of the fact that the decisionmaker may not have
the most up-to-date information in a specific field. This is particularly
true with workplace claims, which continue to evolve over time.254
Indeed, the nature and parameters of the workplace itself has changed
dramatically in recent years.255 And, the way that we perceive sexual
252 Cf. Hébert, supra note 14, at 336 (“Whether the ‘MeToo’ movement realizes that
potential would seem to depend on whether the courts that are asked to judge the
validity of sexual harassment claims can understand the ways in which the lessons
taught by the ‘MeToo’ movement are relevant to the claims of the individual women
who have been encouraged to speak out against their harassers.”).
253 See supra Part II (discussing data supporting the fact of workplace harassment).
254 See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed
Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 940-41 (“Although it is
certainly true that discrimination has sharply receded since the 1970s, it is also true that
the discrimination that remains has changed in character, becoming more subtle, more
entrenched, and more systemic in nature, which in turn means more difficult to identify
or prove.”). See generally John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature
of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991) (“The nature of
employment discrimination litigation in the federal courts . . . has changed considerably
since Title VII went into effect . . . .”).
255 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and
Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 833 (2019) (“No longer willing to
accept a culture where these behaviors are tacitly condoned and victims’ injuries go
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harassment claims is far different today than it was only a few years
ago.256
A similarly important benefit of the proposed framework is that it
helps streamline the litigation. By applying a straightforward framework
to the complex field of sexual harassment law, the parties are more
easily able to assert and defend individual claims. Thus, rather than
being required to navigate the difficult parameters and elements of a
sexual harassment allegation,257 as well as the complexity of the
plausibility standard, the proposed model helps the courts — and the
litigants — to more fully and easily evaluate the allegations early in the
proceedings.
The model thus provides more certainty to this area of the law. This
certainty is badly needed following the Twombly and Iqbal cases, which
introduced much confusion to the entire pleading process. Employment
discrimination plaintiffs in particular face tremendous difficulty in
pleading their claims.258 This model provides more uniformity to a
unremedied, the #MeToo movement enlists private entities as agents of reform to both
challenge — and ultimately replace — extant norms of sexual conduct. Using social
media and the press, the #MeToo movement has identified recidivist harassers and
workplaces where sexual harassment and sexual assault are rife, advocated for increased
workplace harassment training, and, ultimately, called for the expulsion from the
workplace of several high-profile men who, for years, engaged in objectionable conduct
with impunity.” (footnotes omitted)).
256 See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 14, at 335 (“The ‘MeToo’ movement has already had
dramatic effects on the way that sexual harassment is viewed as a cultural matter, raising
societal awareness of the prevalence of sexual harassment and of the harms that it
causes. In a matter of months, allegations of sexual harassment have resulted in the
resignations, suspensions, or discharges of public officials, including judges, senators,
and representatives, as well as newscasters, actors, and other celebrities.”); see also Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 24 (2018)
(“With the rise of the #MeToo movement, we are witnessing an extraordinary cultural
moment of resistance against sexual harassment — one that could galvanize real
change.”).
257 See Hébert, supra note 14, at 325 (discussing the difficulty plaintiffs often face
“satisfy[ing] the various elements of a claim of sexual harassment”); see also Daniel
Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1583, 1605 (2018) (discussing “substantial hurdles for victims of harassment”).
258 See supra Part I (discussing difficulty employment discrimination plaintiffs have
experienced navigating plausibility standard); see also Brooke D. Coleman, The
Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 522 (2012) (“[S]cholars have repeatedly
argued that when it comes to proving racial or sexual discrimination, restrictive
procedural doctrines are difficult to overcome.”); Devah Pager & Bruce Western,
Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221,
222 (2012) (“The bulk of evidence . . . suggests that declines in claims of hiring
discrimination result from changing standards of legal evidence and the difficulties
facing plaintiffs in acquiring the necessary information to pursue a successful claim.”
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currently confused process. This type of certainty can further help clear
dockets. Where there is more certainty in the law, there tends to be a
higher rate of settlement.259 Thus, where parties have a better idea of
how the litigation will proceed, the case itself is more likely to be
resolved earlier in the proceedings.260
By highlighting the limited role of plausibility for employment
discrimination cases brought in the harassment context, the proposed
model further saves judicial resources. As the courts and litigants
undoubtedly spend countless hours attempting to define what
plausibility actually means — particularly for workplace cases — there
can be no question that the proposed model helps remove much of the
doubt in this area. Armed with the knowledge that Twombly and Iqbal
are largely irrelevant for sexual harassment claims — at least in the
current workplace climate — courts can allow these cases to proceed
without getting bogged down in technical arguments about the
pleadings.261 Of course, as already noted, there may be certain
exceptions to this general rule, and the defendant will have the
opportunity to more fully develop any argument that the plaintiff’s
claims should not be permitted into discovery.
Some might argue that the model proposed here establishes too low
of a pleading bar, and thus “opens the floodgates” of litigation to sexual
harassment claims. While a fair criticism, the framework really only
(citing Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model
of Employment Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
RESEARCH 3 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005))). See generally Michael
O’Neil, Twombly and Iqbal: Effects on Hostile Work Environment Claims, 32 B.C. J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 151 (2012) (discussing the plausibility standard and harassment cases).
259 See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in
Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 662 (“The more certain the law — the
less the variance in expected outcomes — the more likely the parties will predict the
same outcome from litigation, and the less likely that litigation will occur because of
differences in predicted outcomes.”). See generally Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1983) (discussing relationship between legal certainty and
settlement).
260 See D’Amato, supra note 259, at 17 (“[T]he principal reasons for [litigants] to
settle their dispute without litigation — to avoid the risk and expense of litigation —
are most powerful when the law governing the dispute is less certain.”); Stewart, supra
note 259, at 662.
261 Cf. Marleen A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading:
The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 360 (1989) (“On the whole, a
specific rule increases deterrence and saves judicial resources. These benefits must be
weighed against the costs resulting from a specific rule being both underinclusive and
overinclusive. By enhancing deterrence and saving judicial resources, a specific rule
influences the next tradeoff made in designing a deterrence strategy, the certaintyseverity tradeoff.” (footnotes omitted)).
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acknowledges a straightforward truth about the overt and ongoing
nature of harassment in the workplace. It is also important to note that
the model in no way predicts the outcome of the litigation. Indeed, once
discovery has concluded in a case, the sexual harassment allegations
may still be thrown out on a motion for summary judgment.262 Or, a
plaintiff may be unable to ultimately convince a jury as to the veracity
of the allegations.263 Plaintiffs should at least, however, have the
opportunity to gather the important facts related to their claims that are
frequently only in the employer’s control.
Moreover, as already discussed, this Article concludes that the
plausibility standard is largely irrelevant for sexual harassment claims,
as the vast majority of such allegations are at least plausible on their
face. This argument largely situates the case law for these claims back
262 See, e.g., Murphy v. City of Aventura, 383 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Although [supervisor’s] use of terms like ‘slut,’ ‘whore,’ ‘bitch,’ ‘hooker,’ and his
remark about a young student’s bust size were no doubt degrading and sex based,
[supervisor’s] nine remarks, made over the course of over three years, were neither
severe nor pervasive. [Plaintiff] also failed to produce evidence that [supervisor’s]
conduct unreasonably interfered with her work performance. . . . The district court
correctly granted summary judgment . . . .”); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine:
Fighting the Sexual Harassment Pandemic, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1076 (2018) (“It is not
surprising, therefore, that numerous courts have dismissed cases where plaintiffs have
alleged facts that, although troubling, fail to meet the threshold for liability.” (citing
cases)); Nancy Gertner, Sexual Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88,
97 (2018) (addressing Murphy decision). See generally Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of
Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 75 (1999)
(examining “the trend of courts to grant summary judgment based on the lack of
severity or pervasiveness of the harassment (many times improperly under the
standards set out for such motions)”); Vivian Berger, Michael O. Finkelstein & Kenneth
Cheung, Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination
Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 48 (2005) (“A major part of reality testing in
employment actions involves assessing the chance the defendant will succeed in getting
summary judgment, in whole or in part, against the plaintiff.”).
263 See Gertner, supra note 262, at 96 (“[P]laintiffs in discrimination cases tend to
lose on summary judgment, more so than any other party in any other type of case. If
they manage to get to trial and, significantly, if they convince a jury of their claims, their
damage verdicts run a substantial risk of being reduced by trial judges and their
counsel’s fees slashed — again more than the verdicts or fees of plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
counsel in any other category of case. On appeal, the story is even more striking:
[W]hile summary judgment dismissals are overwhelmingly affirmed by appellate
courts, even successful plaintiffs’ verdicts are reversed more than jury verdicts in other
types of cases.” (alterations in original) (quoting Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of
the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s “Signature” Achievement, in A NATION OF WIDENING
OPPORTUNITIES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, at 165 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R.
Bagenstos eds., 2015))). See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Cases Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
429 (2004) (addressing difficulties of litigating employment discrimination claims).
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to where it was pre-Twombly, but does not lower the pleading bar.
Indeed, before Twombly sexual harassment (and discrimination cases
generally) routinely survived dismissal even where only basic facts were
asserted.264 The model set forth here does not propose a radical
departure from the law. Rather, it advocates for a standard that existed
for decades pre-Twombly. In perhaps the most well-known employment
discrimination pleading decision during this time, Judge Easterbrook
opined that a complaint which only states that “I was turned down for
a job because of my race,” would provide sufficient factual detail to
survive dismissal.265 Similarly in the sexual harassment context,
providing basic facts as to the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged
conduct, along with its imputability to the employer, should be
sufficient to proceed in the case.
A similar criticism of the proposed framework might be that it is too
rigid, and adopts a one-size-fits-all approach that is unworkable in the
face of the unpredictable facts found in everyday workplace litigation.
Again, while a fair concern, the model proposed here is not meant to be
exhaustive, and should serve as only a single approach to evaluating
harassment claims. There are numerous ways to litigate cases involving
sexual misconduct,266 and it is entirely possible that the approach
proposed here will not work in a specific factual scenario. Rather, this
model attempts to capture the vast majority of cases that will be brought
in this area. It also attempts to provide the courts and litigants with the
most up-to-date information in the field, and to serve as a reminder of
the prevalence of discrimination and harassment still found in the
workplace.267
The analytical framework proposed here also comports with the
suggestions of other scholars. For example, Professor Charles Sullivan
has already raised the possibility of using social science information in
employment discrimination cases.268 And, Professor Michael Zimmer
264 See generally Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing the plausibility standard and
employment discrimination cases).
265 Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998).
266 See generally Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing
a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 29 (2003); Linda J. Krieger & Cindi Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual Harassment
Litigation, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 115 (1985).
267 This framework was specifically established for claims of sexual harassment. The
model should not be applied to other Title VII discrimination claims brought outside of
this particular context.
268 Sullivan, supra note 41, at 1666-67, 1671-72. In his Article, Professor Sullivan
provides a superb discussion of the potential use of social science research in these cases
following the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal decisions. Id.
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previously discussed the potential educational role social science
research can provide in the workplace context.269 Building on that
research, this Article explains precisely how to properly place this type
of social science (and related data and statistics) before the federal
courts. And, the model explains how this can specifically be
accomplished in the sexual harassment context.270
In the end, the enormous benefits of the proposed model should
effectively outweigh any existing concerns.271 The ongoing prevalence
of sexual harassment in the workplace demands that we take a fresh
look at how these claims are analyzed, and provide full access to the
courts to those who are the unfortunate victims of sexual harassment.
CONCLUSION
In light of all of the evidence that we now have on the topic, there can
be little doubt that workplace sexual harassment is a fact in our society.
As a fact, it can properly be pled in a federal complaint of sexual
harassment in the employment context. The federal rules generally
allow the social science research, governmental data, and litigation
statistics supporting this fact to be attached to the federal complaint.
And judges should consider this information when deciding whether
the complaint is plausible.
Judge Posner recently stated that “it has taken our courts and our
society a considerable while to realize that sexual harassment, which
has been pervasive in many workplaces (including many Capitol Hill
offices and, notoriously, Fox News, among many other institutions), is
a form of sex discrimination.”272 Given the fact of harassment, any
individual allegation of improper workplace conduct of a sexual nature
should be deemed plausible. While the defendant may rebut this
plausibility, the vast majority of Title VII harassment cases must be
allowed to proceed to discovery. Twombly and Iqbal, then, are largely
269 See Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII’s Last Hurrah: Can Discrimination Be Plausibly
Pled?, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 89-90 (2014).
270 See generally Tristin K. Green, “It’s Not You, It’s Me”: Assessing an Emerging
Relationship Between Law and Social Science, 46 CONN. L. REV. 287, 289 (2013)
(discussing the relationship between employment discrimination law and social
science); Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 39 (2009)
(same); Pager & Western, supra note 258, at 222.
271 Cf. Seiner, supra note 24 (discussing implications of similar model proposed for
Title VII cases).
272 Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 355 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner,
J., concurring).
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irrelevant for sexual harassment claims as the plausibility standard
announced in these Supreme Court cases will ordinarily be satisfied by
the plaintiffs, with only limited exceptions. The fact of sexual
harassment in the workplace can no longer be ignored, and the federal
courts should take these individual Title VII claims much more
seriously.

